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Abstract 
This work examines Maxwell M. Rabb’s role in the area of civil rights and race relations 
from January 1953 through May 1958 during the administration of President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.  Rabb was the first Secretary to the Cabinet, a position created by Eisenhower.  In 
his lesser known duty, Max Rabb quietly developed many aspects of President Eisenhower’s 
civil rights program.  Chapter One describes Rabb’s pivotal role in ending segregation in the 
military establishment to include the Navy and the Veterans Administration.  In this chapter 
Rabb is a lone operator, personally meeting with principal actors in the Eisenhower 
Administration and U.S. Congress to end segregation.  Chapter Two examines how Rabb 
participated in and helped to develop the various organizations of the White House.  As the 
organizations within the Eisenhower White House matured, Rabb was able to use them as roads 
into the problem of civil rights and to use their power to advance civil rights.  The final chapter 
focuses on the confluence of race relations and human rights on the one hand with U.S. domestic 
and foreign policy on the other.  The chapter uses four cases studies to illustrate the growing 
importance of American race relations in world affairs after World War II.  Max Rabb’s 
participation in each case serves as a reminder that the American domestic sphere had become a 
cause of international concern and could damage the credibility of U.S democratic values in the a 
world where racial sensitivity was on the rise and increasingly a factor in international relations.  
This work ends by concluding that Rabb’s effectiveness was severely limited by President 
Eisenhower’s narrow understanding of the limits of government.  Rabb was a New Deal 
Republican serving in the administration of a man who rejected the activism required by New 
Deal Liberalism.  Though Rabb served Eisenhower well, it was Eisenhower who failed to sense 
the full scope of the problems in U.S. civil rights and race relations.   
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Dedication 
To Kim.  How could this not be for you?   
INTRODUCTION 
Maxwell M. Rabb and Civil Rights 
 The civil rights movement had many heroes.  Some were great and well known 
such as the martyred Reverend Martin Luther King and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell.  
Others will never be known, such as the millions of local people who daily endured the 
indignities of racism and at times its violence.  This work is dedicated to revealing one of the 
greatest but least known champions of the civil rights movement, Maxwell Rabb.  Max Rabb is 
easily one of the least appreciated members of Dwight Eisenhower’s presidential administration.  
He was known to many people in government and in the private sector for his work before, 
during, and after the Eisenhower administration.  What was not widely known, however, was the 
astounding scope of his work in race relations and in civil rights on behalf of President 
Eisenhower.  The face of the movement belonged to public figures such as Powell and King, and 
the body of the movement to the local people, but in the Eisenhower administration Maxwell 
Rabb did the work of the movement.   
Max Rabb was a quiet and unheralded force whose boundless energy and commitment to 
racial justice improved the lives of countless American men and women of all classes, creeds, 
races, and origins.  Max Rabb was the secret engineer of the Eisenhower civil rights program.  
President Eisenhower and the more prominent members of the administration, such as Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell, were ultimately responsible for public policy and its consequences.  
However, it was Max Rabb’s work and influence that directly or indirectly undergirded that 
policy or made it possible.  There were even times when the results of Rabb’s initiatives became 
de facto administration policy.  While Rabb was not involved in all of the Eisenhower civil rights 
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initiatives, there can be little doubt that his efforts represent great progress in a revolutionary era 
of improved civil rights within the nation.  This work will focus on Max Rabb’s personal 
contribution in the area of civil rights and race relations and how he worked to improve the 
image of the Eisenhower Administration.  
A Brief Review of President Dwight Eisenhower’s Civil Rights Record 
 The most socially and legally significant event in civil rights during the Eisenhower era 
was the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (Brown) decision handed down 
unanimously by the Supreme Court, 17 May 1954.  President Eisenhower was personally 
sympathetic toward the white south and ambivalent towards social integration, however, he 
allowed the Attorney General to file an amicus brief opposing school segregation in November 
1953.  Herbert Brownell’s brief supported overturning the Plessy v. Ferguson (Plessy) decision 
(1896) which legally enshrined the notion of “separate but equal.”  In the Plessy case the Court 
had decided that racial segregation in public facilities did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
and that separating the races was not unreasonable.  Brownell’s brief signaled that Eisenhower 
had deferred to Brownell over the wishes of his Southern friends such as South Carolina 
Governor James Byrnes.1  Eisenhower’s decision to privilege Brownell over his own friendships 
was especially significant given that Byrnes had been advising him how best to develop a true 
two party system in the American South—a matter of enormous historical and electoral 
importance.2 The Brown case was the culminating event of a 20 year legal struggle initiated by 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to end the 
                                                 
1 David A. Nichols, A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2007), 59-60.     
2 Robert H. Ferrell ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 246.  
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segregated practices of the United States known collectively as “Jim Crow.”  The Brown 
decision overturned the Plessy decision, ruling that “separate was inherently unequal.”   
The unanimity of the Brown decision implied that the outcome was inevitable, but it was 
the sudden, and fateful, death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson, in summer 1953, that made it 
possible.  President Eisenhower appointed California Governor Earl Warren to replace Vinson as 
Chief Justice.  It was Warren who moved the Court towards unanimity, thereby buttressing the 
authority of the result.  Under Vinson the Court was at loggerheads over the issue of relief—
exactly how, and at what pace, the Court would order integration.  Warren made the critical 
decision to consider relief in a separate opinion, divorced from the merits of segregation.3  The 
Brown decision did little to change the immediate situation in public schools; it would take at 
least another decade for actual progress to be made.  Nevertheless, for the first time real social 
change was possible.  The importance of the Brown decision cannot be understated.  The Court 
was unequivocal that “separate but equal” was unconstitutional.  The greater challenge was how 
to handle the conversion of a society long accustomed to segregation into one in which white and 
black members alike shared the same public and social space.   
Although public school remained segregated, the cascading effects of the Brown decision 
were immediate in other areas.  It was the start of a general attack on racial segregation by civil 
rights organizations in all public areas such as parks, swimming pools, beaches, courthouses, 
golf courses, theaters and in public transportation.  These attacks were less contested than trying 
to integrate public schools, but no less important.4  The use of public social space by both races 
                                                 
3 Dennis J. Hutchinson, Brown v. Board of Education, Editor in Chief, Kermit L. Hall, et al., The Oxford 
Companion To The Supreme Court Of The United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 93-94.  This 
citation covers all the preceding data. 
4 Alfred H. Kelley, Winfred A. Harbison, Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 
Sixth Ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), 613.  Hereafter cited as Kelley et al. 
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was an important step towards full equality in American society and foreshadowed integration in 
pubic education. 
Herbert Brownell and President Eisenhower also succeeded in pressuring Congress to 
pass landmark civil rights legislation—the first since Reconstruction.  The Civil Rights Act of 
1957, primarily authored by Brownell and revised by Eisenhower, contained three of its original 
four provisions.  The act established a Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), and created the Civil Rights Commission.  It also gave the Attorney General the power to 
apply for injunctions on behalf of individuals deprived of the right to vote, and extended the 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts over actions for protection of civil rights including the 
right to vote.  This provision also allowed those held in contempt of court for civil offenses to be 
prosecuted under criminal provisions.  The original third provision, which did not make it into 
law, would have allowed the Attorney General to file suits to protect all constitutional rights.5   
Eisenhower’s legislation not only provided a precedent for federal level intervention in 
civil rights but also a model for the kinds of issues that future legislative acts on civil rights 
should address.  One such future law was the Civil Rights Act of 1960.  It legally obligated the 
states to preserve the records of federal elections and provided for federal court-appointed voter-
referees to receive applications from anyone allegedly denied the right to vote.6  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were other examples of legislation 
inspired by Eisenhower’s ground breaking act of 1957.  The 1964 act promoted civil rights on
two broad fronts.  It banned discrimination in public accommodations and allowed the Attorney 
General to seek desegregation of public education on his own authority.  The 1965 law 
authorized the Attorney General to send federal registrars into any area suspected of 
 
                                                 
5 Nichols, 168. 
6 Kelley et al., 619, 620. 
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discrimination.  This law more than any other really made a difference in the lives of Southern 
blacks; within five years—by 1969—black registration in the South almost doubled from 36 to 
65 perc
.   
k 
s 
r 
 
thority and support black rights, an action no president had undertaken since 
Recons
ach 
n the political 
problems of civil rights, each man closely mirroring the progress of the other.    
                                                
ent.7 
Although these were absolutely essential events and occurrences in civil rights history, 
Eisenhower may be most remembered for what happened in Little Rock, Arkansas, in fall 1957
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus defied a federal court order when he refused to allow blac
children to enroll in high school along with white children.  Faubus’ persistent defiance of 
federal authority—after a prolonged stalemate—required Eisenhower to send in federal troop
and activate the Arkansas National Guard to uphold federal law and end Faubus’s defiance.  
Even though Eisenhower ended the impasse, public schools in the South remained segregated fo
many more years.  However, this fact should not overshadow the significance of Eisenhower’s
actions—no matter how reluctant he may have been.  He sent federal troops into the South to 
enforce federal au
truction.8 
Max Rabb’s civil rights work closely shadowed Herbert Brownell’s actions.  Both men 
sought the same thing, greater and personal involvement from Eisenhower on civil rights.  E
man pursued that goal through separate channels.  While Brownell took a more public and 
visible role addressing the legal aspects of civil rights, Rabb worked discreetly o
President Dwight Eisenhower’s Systemic View  
 
7 Paul Finkelman and Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States, Volume 
II From 1877 to the Present Second ed. (New York: Oxford University, 2002), 797, 798, 808, 809. 
8 Finkelman and Urofsky, 790,791. 
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Dwight Eisenhower had explicit civil rights goals when he campaigned in 1952, and he 
made bold pronouncements about what he would do if elected.  At a rally on October 9, 195
said, “I am for wiping out every inequality of opportunity.  And I am for starting to do that ri
in our nation’s capital as well as in every other operation, military and civil, of our Federal 
government.”  Later on in the presidential campaign he said, “There is discrimination.  This 
crusade is pledged to use every single item of leadership and influence it has to eliminate it.  It 
intends to enforce the full Constitution,
2 he 
ght 
 not part of it.”9  It is clear that Eisenhower had included 
civil rig
 the 
.  
ights.  One 
 
the speech dealt with civil and social rights.  Here 
                                                
hts as part of his plan, but the way he thought about civil rights was directly related to the 
way he intended to solve the problem. 
Almost immediately upon assuming his new office, Eisenhower gave his first State of
Union address.  In this speech he revealed his systemic view of how things were interconnected
It was Eisenhower’s tendency to group certain issues and concerns together.  He did not see 
problems as isolated but as parts of a greater whole.  As a result of viewing problems and their 
causes broadly, he wanted to use common, general or comprehensive solutions rather than case-
by-case special measures.  This had important consequences for his approach to civil r
important example of this tendency was the way he linked national spending, debt management, 
and taxes together with defense and foreign policy.  The budget was one of President 
Eisenhower’s obsessions.  One of his goals was to avoid the destruction of that which he had
pledged to defend, and irresponsible spending and unwise foreign policy could bring about 
exactly that bad end.10  The final point of 
 
9 Letter, Val J. Washington, Assistant to the Chairman, Republican National Committee to Wilton Persons, Deputy 
Assistant to the President, 3 June 1953, in Secretary of the Navy Folder 5, Box 6, Max Rabb Civil Rights Parallel 
File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.  Hereafter listed as DDEL. 
10 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security 
Policy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 134-136.   
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again he exhib
compat
, including the Federal Government, and any segregation in the 
rmed Forces.  There is one sphere in which civil rights are inevitably involved in 
Federal legislation.  This is the sphere of immigration…[and] in another but related area 
 and in 
xplains why 
tion, 
 education, right along with civil rights and 
desegre
ncy to 
Therefore Eisenhower’s campaign promises focused only on areas he believed he, as a president, 
could change.  Arthur Larson—a trusted Eisenhower speech writer—who believed the President 
                                                
ited the same tendency and grouped together items he believed were logically 
ible.   Eisenhower said he would: 
use whatever authority exists in the office of the President to end segregation in 
the District of Columbia
A
–that of social rights.11 
 
It is clear that in this address Eisenhower revealed a broad definition of civil rights
his mind linked them to social rights.  Along with civil and social rights he also included the 
need to reform the U.S. school system, the need of the Food and Drug Administration to 
continue factory inspections, and the health and housing needs of the American people.  This 
important example of his thinking demonstrates how Eisenhower regarded civil rights and race 
relations.  To him they were a subset of a greater issue—that of human rights.  This e
he spoke about social rights, by which he meant things like social security benefits, immigra
housing, health, factory inspections, and
gation.  To him these topics were part of a greater and higher purpose—the general 
improvement of the human condition.   
There was, however, at least one serious potential problem in Eisenhower’s tende
group similar items together.  Thinking this way risked limiting the range of possible solutions, 
because Eisenhower did not try to solve specific problems but rather a set of problems.  
 
11 President Eisenhower, State of the Union Speech, 2 February 1953, in Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. 
Larsen, The Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961: Documentary History Volume I (New York: Random House, 
Inc., 1971), 90-106.  Hereafter cited as Documentary History. 
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was not personally sympathetic to integration, acknowledged that Eisenhower was strongly 
committed to enforcing federal authority.12  He wrote that Eisenhower felt compelled to:  
do a conscientious job of promoting integration within areas where [he] had 
special legal responsibility.  Desegregation in the armed forces…was largely carried 
through by President Eisenhower.  He also eliminated segregation in the Veterans 
Administration hospitals, schools on military posts, naval bases, and the District of 
Columbia government.  He…achieved desegregation in public accommodations and 
public housing in the District.  Moreover, he put real life into measures requiring 
contractors…to refrain from discriminatory practices.13  
 
Eisenhower promised only what he could deliver in the federal establishment and said 
nothing of equality of opportunity within the jurisdiction of the states.  This explains why 
Eisenhower insisted that the best solution to civil rights problems was to ensure that blacks were 
enabled to exercise their constitutional right to vote.  That would allow them to vote their way to 
a better life by participating in the American political process.     
Dwight Eisenhower’s statements as a candidate and later as President show that he had 
good intentions and clear goals in mind.  However, he lacked any definite plan of action to 
address civil rights in order to reach those ends.  Max Rabb filled the gap between Eisenhower’s 
presidential promises and the heightened expectations they created.  He was a near perfect fit for 
the way Eisenhower preferred to approach and to solve problems. 
President Dwight Eisenhower’s Hidden Approach  
President Eisenhower’s approach to desegregation was subtle and largely done in private 
in order to avoid controversy.  Eisenhower wanted to seek results rather than seek publicity, 
                                                 
12 Arthur Larson also served as the Under Secretary of Labor and Director of the United States Information Agency 
in the Eisenhower administration.  While a speech writer in the White House his title was Special Assistant.   
13 Arthur Larson, Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew (New York: Popular Library, 1968), 119-120. 
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which he believed Presidents Harry Truman and Franklin Roosevelt had done to a fault.14 He did 
not believe there was real value in knowingly submitting legislation that “habitually met defeat 
from opposition led by members of the Democratic Party itself.”15  According to Eisenhower, 
Truman and Roosevelt submitted civil rights legislation every year, such as anti-lynching or 
equal employment legislation, but knew it had no serious chance of passage.  And this he 
believed were false overtures to make it appear as if they wanted change.  He therefore 
concluded that it was deceptive and for the sake of self-promotion.  Rabb called this the 
“Roosevelt formula” of action on civil rights.  Rabb later explained Eisenhower’s positions in 
similar words, as “simply an attempt to try to gain the passage of civil rights laws in 
Congress…the Congress…and the President [both] knew that this was just a routine operation 
from which results were not in the slightest expected.”16     
According to Rabb, Eisenhower thought that race relations and civil rights “should be 
handled quietly and unofficially.”  Rabb adopted this approach when he began his work on civil 
rights.  There were indications that he preferred that the President pay more attention to civil 
rights.  Nonetheless he was convinced, as was Eisenhower, that giving it open attention would 
begin to draw unwanted attention from those who opposed progress in the field.17  President 
Eisenhower envisioned Rabb working in the same manner.  This did not mean that the 
administration would not advertise the results and try to capitalize on them, but progress would 
be accomplished with little fanfare along the way.  Nor did it mean that Rabb lacked the official 
                                                 
14 Maxwell Rabb interview, October 6, 1970, Columbia University Oral History Project (COHP), OH-265, pp. 8-9, 
DDEL.   
15 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956: The White House Years (New York: Double Day & 
Company, Inc., 1963), 234. 
16 Maxwell Rabb interview, October 6, 1970, Columbia University Oral History Project (COHP), OH-265, p. 10, 
DDEL.  Hereafter cited as OH-265, DDEL.  Rabb’s feelings about the Roosevelt formula can be found in this 
citation. 
17 Interview with Ruth Rabb, Widow of Max Rabb, by author, 13 February 2008.   
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backing of the President.  Rather it meant that Rabb handled things through personal and often 
private arrangements rather than through formal and public statements such as executive orders.  
Even the commissions Eisenhower created through executive order worked quietly.  Both 
Eisenhower and Rabb believed that working quietly was less likely to meet opposition because it 
avoided controversy, and would not stir public emotions.  The added advantage of working on a 
problem in this manner was isolation.  Rabb and Eisenhower hoped to limit the access that 
outsiders had to the problem.  If they could achieve that they could quietly resolve the problem in 
the most beneficial manner to blacks.  That is what Rabb did—he contained problems and 
compartmentalized them in order to defuse them.  Taken altogether Rabb’s work and methods 
were largely hidden from the public.  This hidden approach was meant to be discreet and should 
not be negatively construed to mean secretive or deceptive. 
   To Eisenhower civil rights and race relations, along with their other socially related 
issues, were problems like any other.  Therefore, he refused to privilege civil rights over other 
domestic issues.  He was not unsympathetic towards minorities, but he believed that open 
attention would be to the disadvantage of other issues.  Thus, too, he thought that civil rights 
issues could be worked on by any intelligent, hard-working person, and not necessarily a subject 
matter expert or member of a minority group.  That is what Max Rabb was to Eisenhower—a 
well qualified, hard-working individual, who, as it happened, was a Jew and thus a member of a 
minority group.  That was the Eisenhower approach to civil rights and that was how Max Rabb 
fit into Eisenhower’s vision of progress.  Given Rabb’s personal history, it is easy to see why 
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Eisenhower believed Rabb was qualified to advise him and solve problems at the presidential 
level. 18 
 The Early Life of Max Rabb from Boston to the White House       
 Maxwell Milton Rabb was born to Solomon and Rose Rabb on September 28, 
1910, in Boston, Massachusetts.  His parents were Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe who 
met and married in the United States.  His father was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
his mother in Russia.  His maternal grandparents were wealthy lumber merchants but sensed that 
life for Jews in Tsarist Russia could only get worse and immigrated to the United States.  
Solomon Rabb was a well-to-do businessman, a wholesale food merchant, who wanted to 
provide his children with maximum opportunities in life.  Max was one of four children, 
preceded by his older sister Frances, and his brother George, then followed by his younger 
                                                 
18 This interpretation of Max Rabb’s role is in contrast to the popular conception of him as merely a trouble shooter.  
Certainly Rabb was a “fixer and troubleshooter” but limiting his role in the Eisenhower administration to that of 
“troubleshooter” is a gross injustice to him, his work and President Eisenhower.  One historical account of the White 
House staff says that “most of the activities Rabb did undertake involved troubleshooting.”  Charles E. Walcott and 
Karen M. Hult, Governing the White House From Hoover Through LBJ (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1995), 124.  Historian Herbert Parmet wrote that when Adam Clayton Powell ignited a firestorm in the 
White House with an offensive letter, “Eisenhower sent troubleshooter Max Rabb to see the Congressman.”  Herbert 
Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 419.  Rabb’s own 
boss, Sherman Adams, even summed up his role that way.  He wrote that Rabb had “the special duty of acting as 
trouble shooter on what we called minority problems.”  Sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of the 
Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 335.  Another historian wrote that Rabb’s 
“primary duties were those of a political troubleshooter who assumed responsibility for containing politically 
embarrassing racial incidents, providing the administration’s response to minority complaints, and promoting 
Republican interests in the black community.”  Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black 
Civil Rights (Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 70.   
Rabb had much more agency in civil rights then merely cleaning up after the administration.  Yes, Rabb did 
all the things each author says he did, however, by no means was “troubleshooting” his primary duty.  To begin 
with, after the fall of 1953 Rabb was the Secretary to the Cabinet, which was his primary role in the administration.  
Furthermore, “troubleshooting” implies reactivity rather than proactivity and Rabb was very forward looking in his 
initiatives.  The label of troubleshooter has likely stuck because historians have largely handed it down to each other 
but also because such an interpretation dwells on the failures or more embarrassing moments of the Eisenhower 
administration, which tended to be more public than its victories which were handled quietly.  Furthermore Rabb’s 
troubleshooting had immediate benefits for the Eisenhower Administration, whereas much of his other work had 
long-term benefits.  Finally, Rabb so fully subscribed to Eisenhower’s method of working quietly, behind the 
scenes, and with little fanfare, that tracing his actions and their effects can be difficult.             
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brother Warren.  While having no formal education themselves, his parents stressed it as a means 
of improvement and sent their children to preparatory schools.19   
Max graduated from Harvard University in 1932 in three years with a degree in History.  
After passing on an opportunity to study at Oxford he enrolled in Harvard Law School.  Had he 
gone he likely would not have met Ruth Dryden, a Radcliffe College girl, whom he would later 
marry but not before graduating from law school in 1935.  In that same year he was admitted to 
the Massachusetts Bar and entered private practice with his brother, George, from 1935 through 
1937.  He joined the Republican Party and through it befriended many Massachusetts Brahmins.  
From 1937 through 1943, Max Rabb served as the administrative assistant to Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts.  In 1939 Max married Ruth and Lodge was Rabb’s best 
man.20  Rabb’s work with Lodge had given him access to the Republican Party and in 1940 Rabb 
actively supported Wendell Willkie’s presidential campaign, riding the campaign train with him 
and Lodge.21  He served Lodge until the senator resigned his position to serve in World War II.  
Rabb continued to serve Lodge’s successor, Senator Charles Sinclair Weeks, in the same 
capacity, until Rabb joined the Navy in 1944.  Rabb was exempt from the draft because of age 
and fatherhood, but joined the service to contribute to the defeat of Hitler and fascism.  He was 
the executive officer on an LSM, landing ship medium, used to transport men and cargo to and 
from shore.  Because of his political experience he was eventually selected to be the aide to the 
                                                 
19 Maxwell Rabb interview, 22 February 1974, William E. Weiner Oral History Library, p. 1-1–1-3, The New York 
Public Library, New York City, New York.  Hereafter cited as Rabb interview p. #, NYPL.    
20 New York Post, article, Daily Closeup, November 5 1974, Vertical File Folder, Blaustein Library, American 
Jewish Committee, New York City, New York.  Hereafter cited as BL, AJC.   
21 Rabb interview p. 1-43, NYPL.  Rabb grew very close to Willkie and became one of his closest friends in later 
years.  He also gained very valuable campaign experience during this time. 
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chief of staff of the amphibious service.  He was then moved to the Department of the Navy, 
where he worked in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. 22   
Rabb served as a legal consultant to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal who, in 1944, 
had succeeded the recently deceased Frank Knox.  This is where Rabb was when the war ended.  
Once Navy officials discovered his legislative experience in working for Senators Lodge and 
Weeks, he was asked to stay on as a civilian with Navy.  He worked on problems associated with 
unifying the armed forces under one cabinet-level secretary.  In this job Rabb became acquainted 
with the Navy’s senior admirals as well as with Forrestal.  Rabb called the unification project 
“the greatest war almost of all times” and “a tremendous fight.”  Max Rabb and General 
Eisenhower did not meet during this time but the General was certainly aware of the Navy’s 
position regarding unification.23   
In 1946 Rabb returned to private practice in Boston with his brother.  Rabb also served 
part time for nine months as a minority consultant to the Rules Committee of the Senate. 24  He 
also remained active in the Republican Party and through it met Christian Herter, a future 
Secretary of State for Eisenhower.25 Then Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., back in the Senate, asked him 
to be his Executive Assistant—Rabb agreed.  Lodge was asked by certain powerful Republicans 
to manage Eisenhower’s presidential campaign, thus becoming a charter member of the 
Eisenhower movement.  Senator Lodge invited Rabb to join a group convened to explore the 
                                                 
22 Who’s Who In America: A Biographical Dictionary of Notable Living Men and Women (Chicago: Marquis 
Publications, 1954) Volume 29, 1953-1954, p. 2092, (Hereafter cited as Who’s Who); Rabb interview pp. 1-17 – 1-
19. 
23 Rabb interview pp. 1-37 – 1-41, NYPL 
24 Document, Maxwell M. Rabb, undated, Maxwell M. Rabb (Personal), Folder 6, Box 5, Maxwell M. Rabb: Papers 
1939-1989, hereafter cited as Rabb Papers, DDEL; Rabb interview 1-42, NYPL. 
25 Rabb also came into contact with Joseph Kennedy and his son John F. Kennedy.  Rabb claimed that while Joseph 
Kennedy was not overly fond of Jews, he took a liking to Rabb and offered him $30,000 a year to be John’s lawyer 
but Rabb refused out of loyalty to Lodge and the Republicans, Rabb interview p. 1-26, NYPL.  
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viability of an Eisenhower candidacy for President.26  Lodge then brought Rabb into the 
campaign.  In this way Rabb became one of the original members of the same movement.27 
Rabb distinguished himself during the 1952 Republican convention and presidential 
campaign.  He proved himself very useful and demonstrated many valuable political skills during 
this time.  Lodge and Rabb busied themselves building a national organization and blocking 
Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft from consolidating his position in the South and thus seriously 
challenging Eisenhower as the Republican candidate.28  At the convention, Rabb’s role was to 
herd delegates into the Eisenhower camp.  He said, “I would appeal [to the delegates] on 
whatever basis we could make a legitimate and effective appeal.”29  Rabb was very familiar with 
many Jewish Republicans from his work with Lodge and Weeks and many were eager to support 
candidate Dwight Eisenhower. A fellow Jewish Republican wrote to Rabb, first congratulating 
him on his work during the Republican primary and then offering to put a chain of hotels at 
Eisenhower’s disposal.  The hotels were in important American cities: Boston, Chicago, 
Cleveland and nothing short of the Ritz Towers in New York.  More to the point was his offer to 
“[line Jews] up financially and otherwise for Eisenhower.”  This supporter further stated, “I 
believe it is of utmost importance to get both Jewish money and Jewish votes for the Republican 
Party.”30  Surely Eisenhower, Lodge, and Rabb agreed. 
One of Rabb’s least known accomplishments was his role as messenger for members of 
the Republican Party elite at the convention.  When the party began thinking of possible running 
                                                 
26 William B. Pickett, Eisenhower Decides to Run: Presidential Politics and Cold War Strategy (Chicago: Ivan R. 
Dee Publisher, 2000), 144. 
27 Senator Lodge focused so much on the Eisenhower Campaign that he failed to vigorously campaign on his own 
behalf and lost his Senate seat to John F. Kennedy.   
28 Picket, 143. 
29 Rabb interview, OH-265, p.2, DDEL. 
30 Letter, A.M. Sonnabend to Rabb, 13 July, 1952, Eisenhower Correspondence Part IV, Folder 4, Box 4, Rabb 
Papers, DDEL. 
 14
mates for Eisenhower, Senator Lodge and New York Governor Thomas Dewey designated Rabb 
“as the go-between” with California Senator Richard Nixon.  He was the only one allowed to 
speak with Nixon on behalf of the party so that word would not reach California Governor Earl 
Warren, a presidential aspirant, and keeper of the California delegates.  Rabb said that, while 
others certainly spoke to Nixon about the possibility of being on the ticket, he was the “unofficial 
official liaison.”31   
After the election but before Eisenhower assumed office, Rabb revealed one of his great 
talents, choosing people to serve on the President’s teams.  This was a role he would reprise 
many times over, one that had long-lasting effects on the course of civil rights in American 
history.  A newspaper reported that the new administration might create a commission to review 
segregation practices.  Rabb recommended a slate of names for consideration to serve in that 
capacity.  Among those he considered fit for membership was Nobel recipient William Faulkner.  
Rabb said of him, “It would be dramatic to have a Southerner…[he] won a Nobel Prize and he 
was never used by the Democrats.”  To balance the group, he recommended a Jesuit priest, a 
Jew, a female, and two blacks, one being A. Phillip Randolph, the famous International President 
of the Sleeping Car Porters.32   
Although no such group materialized, the aim of producing this mixed slate is suggestive 
of progressive liberal thinking and political acumen.  The diversity in race, religion, and 
background of the people Rabb at least ensured that every point of view might be represented on 
the panel.  Later, Rabb held over members of some of Truman’s committees and had them serve 
on some of Eisenhower’s committees. 
                                                 
31 Maxwell Rabb interview, 7 May 1971, COHP, OH-309, p.8-9, DDEL.  Hereafter cited as Rabb interview OH-
309, DDEL. 
32 Memorandum, Rabb to Sherman Adams, 23 December 1952, Old Correspondence (2), Folder 2, Box 24, Rabb 
Papers, DDEL.  
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By the end of 1952, Rabb had built an impressive resume of skills and experience.  He 
was a Harvard graduate twice over, a practicing lawyer, and a military veteran.  He was well 
connected in both parties by virtue of his service to Senators Lodge and Weeks.33  He understood 
the legislative process on Capitol Hill, was personally acquainted with many Congressmen, and 
had extensive campaign experience at local, state and national levels.  He participated in the 
great unification debate within the defense establishment and was a minority consultant to a 
Senate committee.  Aside from a personal interest in Jewish and Israeli affairs there was nothing 
that overtly qualified him to work civil rights or race-related issues in the White House.  
Nonetheless he exhibited qualities that Eisenhower liked, such as loyalty, leadership, and 
intelligence, and worked well with minimal supervision. 
The campaign and convention revealed Rabb’s capabilities and diverse talents.  In 
negotiating with Nixon for vice-president, he proved he could be trusted and could work 
discreetly.  Also, he was appealing to Jewish leaders whose money and votes were needed to 
slice into this overwhelmingly Democratic bloc.  He cultivated support among delegates at the 
convention and helped Lodge run the national campaign.  Finally, he was making intelligent 
suggestions about race relations even before Eisenhower assumed office.  This diversity and 
range of talents, abilities and traits won him a position in the Eisenhower administration.  Once 
in the White House, Rabb became involved with the legal aspects of civil rights and race 
relations but was not yet the chosen instrument that he later became.  He was one of several staff 
members who handled a multitude of issues.     
                                                 
33 Rabb said, “One thing I think I did in those days was to keep a very close relationship with the Roosevelt 
government.”  Rabb was very close to David Niles, who worked minority affairs issues for Roosevelt and Truman.  
He also credits some of his legislative success under Lodge and Weeks to these relationships, Rabb interview, p. 1-
33, NYPL. 
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Max Rabb did not handle civil rights or race-related issues to the exclusion of other 
problems, nor was Rabb the only staff member to work on civil rights.  He was not brought into 
the White House for any previous expertise related to civil rights nor was he expected to focus 
solely on it as a problem.34  However, an external force, in the form of Congressman Adam 
Clayton Powell, intervened and created the opportunity that involved Rabb in civil rights.  Rabb 
was sent to meet and deal with Powell, who had publicly humiliated the President in an open 
letter.  Thereafter, Rabb remained involved in civil rights and began by completing what Harry 
Truman had started, military desegregation.  As a result of this episode, Rabb became known to 
many as President Eisenhower’s proxy on civil rights and race relations, giving him more 
authority to resolve these issues.  As the Eisenhower Administration matured, so did its internal 
organizations.  Rabb contributed immensely to this process of organizational maturation and 
development.  He demonstrated great leadership as he helped to create the necessary 
mechanisms, procedures and organizations required to support President Eisenhower and civil 
rights.  An examination of how Rabb functioned in group environments reveals a different but 
equally important role from the one he played in completing the desegregation of the military.  
Either through direct service on committees or by acting as a consultant to them, Rabb gave 
definite shape to their outcomes and steered them towards progress in civil rights.  Finally, Rabb 
worked on various other issues of race for the administration that had direct effects on American 
prestige in the cold war.  Taken all together, Max Rabb’s work for Eisenhower in civil rights and 
race relations was and remains a significant and overlooked contribution to a new and 
revolutionary era of progress.35 
                                                 
34 Rabb interview, OH-265, 2, 6. 
35 In contrast to the conventional wisdom, the Eisenhower administration was not barren in the field of civil rights, 
nor was the President as weak in this field as many historians have characterized it.  The myth persists that 
Eisenhower was a failure in this field.  Stephen E. Ambrose said of him, “In civil rights, as in civil liberties, 
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CHAPTER 1 - 
                                                                                                                                                            
Military Desegregation: The End of the 
Beginning 
General Eisenhower, Race and the Military 
To best understand how President Eisenhower chose to approach civil rights and race 
relations, one must first understand Eisenhower’s ideological boundaries.  Understanding his 
limits helps explain the level of his willingness, or what some say was his lack of willingness, to 
intervene in the problems associated with race.  Furthermore, President Eisenhower strongly 
disagreed with President Harry Truman’s style of leadership and his approach to problem 
solving.  A brief examination of some of Eisenhower’s encounters with race and Harry Truman’s 
style are essential to understanding the way in which Max Rabb would have to operate within 
Eisenhower’s limits.    
Dwight Eisenhower was born in 1890 in Texas and raised in Abilene, Kansas.  He lived 
his entire adult life, minus his brief presidency of Columbia University, in the Army right until 
he resigned his commission in order to run for office.  Once in the Army he lived in a segregated 
society everywhere he went, even though he was stationed in places where segregation was not 
supported by law.  Americans served in a segregated Army no matter where they were stationed.  
Not only did blacks serve in all-black units, but they were also generally relegated to support 
 
Eisenhower was not a reluctant leader—he was no leader at all.  He just wished the problems would go away.”  
Ambrose went on to claim that, “Eisenhower’s refusal to lead was almost criminal,” in Stephen E. Ambrose, 
Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 542.  Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo 
Richardson wrote, “Eisenhower clearly understood the need for education and moral leadership, he provided 
neither,” in Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 157.  Arthur Larson wrote, “there emerges the inescapable conclusion 
that President Eisenhower, during his presidential tenure, was neither emotionally nor intellectually in favor of 
combating segregation in general,” Larson, 119.  Historian Robert Burk has written that Eisenhower’s actions were 
only “limited steps to promote a symbolic image of racial democracy while reducing government paternalism,” 
Robert Frederick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville, Tennessee: The 
University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 16.   
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branches.  These branches offered limited opportunities for promotion.  Not surprisingly, 
Eisenhower’s views on segregation and race relations were the same as other great men of his 
times.  To him it was simply normal to have such divisions in society.  That he was a career 
military officer also added another layer of complexity to the problem.  Not only should the races 
be separate, and presumably equal as the law directed, but there were also distinct divisions 
between civil and military affairs.  They were two spheres, each with its own experts, and one 
should not involve itself in the matters of the other.  Max Rabb’s careful involvement on behalf 
of President Eisenhower in the completion of military integration reflected this analysis.  Rather 
than acting confrontationally, Rabb used suasion to generate change.  This approach was in large 
part a reaction to Eisenhower’s distaste for what he perceived to be President Harry Truman’s 
reliance on frontal assaults.      
General George C. Marshall’s words were emblematic of the attitude of the army and its 
senior leaders.  He wrote, in response to a memorandum from Judge William Hastie, the civilian 
aide to the Secretary of War: “Integration…would be tantamount to solving a social problem 
which has perplexed the American people throughout the history of this nation.  The Army 
cannot accomplish such a solution, and should not be charged with the undertaking.”  Marshall 
was uncomfortable with the notion that the Army should be a social laboratory.  He said, 
“Experiments within the Army in the solution of social problems are fraught with danger to 
efficiency, discipline and morale.”  He was patently unconcerned with how discrimination 
decreased the efficiency of the Army and its ability to fight and win wars or with how it affected 
black soldiers.  Instead he believed that integration would wreck the cohesion required to win 
those wars.  To many, cohesion could only be maintained with segregated forces.  Marshall 
added: “The War Department cannot ignore the social relationships between Negroes and whites 
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which had been established by the American people through custom and habit.”36  Many felt, as 
Marshall did, that civilian involvement—beyond the established command responsibilities of 
civilian authority—was a dangerous intrusion into the military sphere where they had neither the 
authority nor the expertise to make decisions.     
Segregation proved to be a cultural flash point in the relationship between the United 
States and Britain during World War II.  Eisenhower accepted a circular stating that the British 
would not adhere to segregation in public places nor would they have their police enforce the 
U.S. Army’s attempt to segregate black soldiers.  However, to avoid trouble many British towns 
succumbed to pressure from Americans and barred blacks from certain places.  Eisenhower 
issued an order that no official restriction be placed on free association, but local commanders 
took their own liberties and Eisenhower largely let them have their way.37  In his recounting of 
the war in Europe Eisenhower mentioned his first press conference, which “had a curious result.”  
He told how he revoked a standing order to censor news items that reported racial incidents.  He 
did so despite being warned by the very same censored journalists and reporters that such stories 
were used by “troublemakers [who] would exaggerate the importance of the incidents 
and…cause domestic dissension.”38  It is hard to know who the troublemakers were, because 
race-related incidents could be used by both those who favored and by those who opposed 
integration to make their cases.  At any rate Eisenhower allowed the stories to be printed.39   
                                                 
36 Memorandum, from Chief of Staff to Secretary of War, 1 December 1941, subject: Report of Judge William H. 
Hastie, 22 September 1941 reprinted in Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor, eds., Blacks in the Military: 
Essential Documents (Wilmington: Delaware, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), 115.  Hereafter referred to as Nalty 
and MacGregor Essential Documents. 
37 Gerald Astor, The Right to Fight: A History of African Americans in the Military (Novato, California: Presidio), 
244-245. 
38 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc 1949), 58-59.  Eisenhower 
did not give a date for this press conference. 
39 Most incidents involved social encounters between British people who refused to discriminate against black 
American soldiers and white soldiers who insisted that black Americans and the British abide by the American 
 20
During the winter of 1944-45 the Germans launched a counter-offensive that would be 
known as the Battle of the Bulge.  Unsuspecting American units in contact with German forces 
were quickly over-taken, defeated, encircled, or in full retreat.  During the crisis, American 
generals asked for black volunteers to fight as infantry.  One field commander wrote, the 
“opportunity to volunteer will be extended to all soldiers without regard to color or race.”  
Perhaps predicting a great response from black troops he further instructed, that, if “the number 
of suitable Negro volunteers exceeds the replacement needs of Negro combat units, these men 
will be suitably incorporated in other organizations so that their service and their fighting spirit 
may be efficiently utilized.” 40  The original plan was for integration but General Eisenhower 
rescinded that order.  Instead Americans fought as a composite force, all-black units next to all-
white units.  The performance of black soldiers during the Bulge was exemplary and a necessary 
first step in integrating the rest of the Army.41  Clearly Eisenhower needed black troops to repel 
the Germans but he was unwilling to test the cohesion of his fighting units by integrating them, 
especially since they were already under the extreme duress of German arms and a harsh 
European winter.   
In 1946 the Army convened a panel of generals led by Lieutenant General Alvan Gillem 
to study the problem of racial segregation in the Army.  The Gillem Board issued a report that 
became the Army’s policy on race and equal opportunity for the next six years.  Although the 
Army limited the black presence in the entire Army to ten percent, the board’s recommendation 
                                                                                                                                                             
social customs of segregation.  What infuriated many white soldiers was that British women openly socialized with 
black troops at dances, movies and other events. 
40 Memorandum, LTG John C.H. Lee to Commanding General, Southern Line of Communication et al. 26 
December 1944 (emphasis in the original), in Nalty and MacGregor Essential Documents, 131.  The emphasis was 
in the original document. 
41 Nalty and MacGregor Essential Documents, 131. 
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did open up service to blacks in all of the Army’s branches.42  It tried to achieve the impossible 
by creating equal opportunity for blacks while keeping them separate from the white force.  
Though the Gillem Report was a perfect example of the principle of “separate but equal,” it was 
not without its strengths.  The report recognized the vital contribution that black soldiers made to 
the war effort, concluded that their manpower was inefficiently used and that black troops were 
poorly trained.  As a result, the Army took necessary steps to correct these deficiencies, thereby 
improving conditions for blacks but not integrating them with whites. The report recommended 
that black officers “be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional 
improvement; and be required to meet the same standard of appointment, promotions and 
retention in all components of the army.”43  Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff of the Army, 
supported the conclusions of the Gillem Board and signed the Army-wide circular.   
In 1948 General Eisenhower defended the policy of segregation in the military in 
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee.   He repeated the standard social arguments 
that the Army could not change faster than the rest of American society and that integration 
would be too traumatic for both black and white soldiers.  Eisenhower said, referring to the race 
problem, “It will disappear through education, through mutual respect, and so on.  But I do 
believe that if we attempt merely by passing a lot of laws to force someone to like someone else, 
we are just going to get into trouble.44  He believed either that, in such an army cohesion and 
therefore military efficiency were impossible or that the Army was not ready for the change.  
This occasion may have been the first public utterance of Eisenhower’s skepticism, often 
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professed, that passing laws to force integration was not a good mechanism for change.45  Such 
views, sincere as they might be, were nothing but unwelcome platitudes for the millions of 
blacks who desired that very same education and respect from the rest of America. 
While campaigning with Dwight Eisenhower during the 1952 campaign, E. Frederic 
Morrow, at the time Eisenhower’s advisor, explained his dilemma to Eisenhower.  It was that, as 
a black man, he had great difficulty standing before black crowds and asking them to vote for 
Eisenhower because he was on record as having favored segregation in the military.  Eisenhower 
turned red and said, “Son, your father’s a minister, isn’t he?”  Morrow replied that he was and 
Eisenhower continued, “Did your father ever teach you anything about forgiveness?”  Morrow 
once again replied affirmatively and Eisenhower closed with, “Well that’s where I am now.”  
Eisenhower continued to tell Morrow that when he asked his field commanders for their input he 
“never questioned them.”   He admitted that it did not dawn on him then as it did later “that most 
of these men had a Southern exposure.”  He then told Morrow that he would “never forget…the 
sacrifice that black soldiers made at the Battle of the Bulge when [he] had to call for every able-
bodied man…to stem the tide.”46 
Harry Truman, Racial Liberalism and Military Integration 
  To Eisenhower and conservatives in both parties, New Deal Liberalism threatened to 
alter the relationship between the government and its citizenry—or perhaps already had.  
Liberalism could alter the balance in the American federal system, usurping the rights of states.47  
Eisenhower had serious misgivings about the philosophy that underlay Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal and Harry Truman’s Fair Deal.  To him they were opportunistic accommodations of 
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various interest groups such as unions, farmers, the elderly, and blacks.  Each of these self-
interested groups put their needs above those of the nation at large and the common good and it 
seemed to Eisenhower that Truman pandered to them.  Eisenhower, from a farming community, 
was not immune to the logic behind creating social benefits in the form of welfare and policies 
like farm relief.  However, he feared that too many years of liberal exposure had created a 
mindset of entitlement and that “only government can bring us happiness, security, and 
opportunity.”48  
  What General Eisenhower may not have understood, and certainly did not feel in 1948, 
was the undeniable pressure to integrate the military as part of the new doctrine of racial 
liberalism.  Harry Truman clearly did feel this pressure and took notice of the changing nature of 
American liberalism.  Aside from the very real need to remain a shining model of democratic 
hope to the world during the Cold War, there was the need to address the fact that segregation 
was fundamentally a social problem and an issue of justice.  Liberals, liberalism, and the policies 
they had created had nowhere to go but to turn their attention to matters of racial justice.  Liberal 
policies—through government intervention—had alleviated, and some claimed beaten, the 
Depression, mobilized the nation for war, and ushered in a new era of American prosperity, 
dominance and world influence.  With fascism and depression defeated, the postwar era saw the 
formation of a succinct rationale for taking deliberate action against racial discrimination, based 
in large part on a successful record of government action during the Depression and war.49     
The ideas and concerns long espoused by black leaders coalesced into a distinct, 
coherent, and politically influential shape.  Most importantly, these ideas were reaching mass 
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audiences, white and black alike.  As an example of this, Harry Truman courageously issued 
Executive Order 9808 in 1946, establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights.50  The 
committee’s report to Truman clearly expressed the new ideas that were in the political ether.  
The members advised him that “the national government should assume leadership in our 
American civil rights program because there is much in the field…that it is squarely responsible 
for in its own dealings with millions of persons.”  The members also advised Truman with 
respect to the international implications of American race relations.  In their report they wrote 
that “an American diplomat cannot forcefully argue for free elections in foreign lands without 
meeting the challenge that in many sections of America qualified voters do not have free access 
to the polls.  Can it be doubted that this is a right which the national government must make 
secure?”51  By making the international reference, they were also strongly suggesting that 
failures in American democracy could directly jeopardize democratic movements across the 
globe and strengthen communist or fascist movements.   
 During the Depression and the war, it was easy to assume that the problems facing 
blacks were simply an exaggerated version of the obstacles facing many whites, and therefore 
subject to the same solutions.  The great majority of Depression-era policies treated poverty and 
unemployment only and were not aimed specifically at alleviating discrimination.52  The 
prosperity of the postwar era threw the disparities between the races into sharp relief.  This 
condition, along with the nation’s position as a leader in the Cold War became great enablers for 
civil rights advocates.  Among whites, notions of liberty and rights took on a greater centrality in 
                                                 
50 Lawson, 44. 
51 Lawson, 127-128. 
52 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Vintage Books, 
1995), 165-166. 
 25
politics.53  This shift created an opportunity for Truman to strike the first blow against 
segregation. 
Truman signed and issued Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948 requiring equality of 
treatment and opportunity for all service members.  Truman’s courageous step was motivated by 
many factors. 54  However bold, nowhere did it mention segregation or integration, instead it 
employed vague language.  The text did not actually require integration, nor did it prescribe any 
deadlines.  Some feared that its stated intent of achieving “equal treatment and opportunity” 
might be reached by adhering strictly to the provisions of separate but equal facilities, based on 
the legal premise that segregation was not discrimination.  Yes, it was vague and imprecise.  It 
was nonetheless courageous and inspired.  Truman issued it while campaigning for President, 
while his party was badly fractured, and while much of the legislation that Truman cared deeply 
about was pending in Congress.  But Harry Truman dispelled any doubt about his intentions at a 
press conference on 29 July.  He was asked, “Mr. President…does your advocacy of equality and 
opportunity in the Armed Services envision eventually the end of segregation?”  Truman simply 
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said, “Yes.”55  Rather than explicitly ending segregation Truman’s order merely made 
integration in the military a possibility.  As Truman was to learn, it would take more then 
Presidential edicts to integrate the military.  It would take strong presidential action an
supervision and intervention, in short, principled leade
d 
rship.               
                                                
Truman expected recalcitrance from his military leaders.  Therefore, to ensure that the 
services complied with his directive, the same order also established the President’s Committee 
on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services.  Its purpose was to 
“examine…the rules, procedures and practices of the armed services in order to determine [how 
they] may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order.”56  The 
committee, known as the Fahy Committee, represented the sum of all fears for Eisenhower.  It 
represented the overt use of government authority to direct social change.  Relations between the 
committee and the services were very tense, combative, and at times, bitter.  Moreover, Truman 
was preempting social change in his military, dangerously using it as a social laboratory.  To the 
military planners, more galling still was the fact that the military establishment was going 
through enough dramatic change and too much at once threatened the potency of American 
arms.57  The early years of the Cold War were especially tense as the both blocs settled into an 
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uneasy peace.  Truman’s tampering with the military establishment might render the armed 
forces vulnerable, weak, and unprepared, thus threatening the nation itself.58 
 The language of the order positioned the committee “within the National Military 
Establishment.”  It would be an entity under its organizational umbrella and therefore answerable 
to the Secretary of Defense.  However, in practice the committee was an instrument of the White 
House and was positioned under the defense umbrella to minimize the overt reliance on 
presidential authority. 59  The committee had no independent authority to design or implement 
policy.  It was, nonetheless, very clear that the committee had access as a result of proximity to 
President Truman.  To go against it was to go against Truman.  To Eisenhower, the methods of 
the Fahy Committee were heavy-handed, relied too much on government power, and were 
dictatorial, confrontational, acrimonious, and altogether too public.  Nonetheless Eisenhower 
greatly admired the strategy of invoking Executive fiat rather than involving the legislative arm 
of the government.60  
Max Rabb the Chosen Instrument of Change 
At a press conference one day short of two months in office on 19 March, 1953, President 
Eisenhower was asked about the persistence of segregation in educational facilities on military 
bases in Texas, Oklahoma and Virginia.61  He responded by saying that he was not aware of such 
practices but that he would look into the matter as he had promised that federal money would not 
subsidize segregated practices.      
The next day the Bureau of the Budget, in a memorandum to the White House, detailed 
the complicated dimensions of segregated schooling on military installations.  The memorandum 
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explained that three different types of schools received federal funds and that Eisenhower’s 
desire to integrate all schools with military dependents unfortunately did not affect them all.  
Those directly affected were on federal land run by a federal agency.  Here he had complete 
jurisdiction to order integration.  He had no authority in schools on non-federal land run by local 
authorities even though they might receive federal money to offset the extra cost of educating the 
children of federal employees.  There was a third type of school where it was unclear if the 
President could extend his authority.  These were schools on federal land but administered by 
local authorities.  Federal law permitted these to be segregated or integrated per state law.  There 
were at least eighteen in that category and the Bureau of the Budget estimated the need for an 
additional one million dollars per year to bring them under full federal management.62   
The same day the Secretary of the Army, Robert Stevens, wrote to the White House 
expressing some of the very same findings as the Budget Bureau.  He, like the Budget Bureau, 
wrote that the Commissioner of Education, whose office was part of the Department of Health, 
Welfare and Education (HEW), might have to provide more funds so that the Army could run 
integrated schools.  The supreme irony of that suggestion was not unnoticed by Stevens, who 
wrote that this would obviously be challenged by many Congressmen as wasteful.  One of the 
strongest cases for integration was that it would increase efficiency by providing one standard 
school system.  Here was a case where integration could have the opposite effect, and increase 
spending once the burden was shifted from local authorities to Federal government.  
Nonetheless, he told the White House that this was an option the Army was willing to use in 
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order to comply with the President’s order.  He did warn the White House that any action they 
took could not prevent local authorities from denying teachers necessary accreditation or make 
off-post districts accept diplomas from children graduating into their school systems from on-
post integrated schools.63    
The White House issued a press release on 25 March, stating that the Army and the 
Bureau of the Budget had both submitted reports to the White House.  The Army reported that all 
schools would be run on an integrated basis “by the opening of the school term next fall.”  That 
was the first public statement by President Eisenhower directing or endorsing a specified action 
supporting the integration of schools.64   
 Despite this great step, the battle had just begun.  The Office of Education within HEW 
found twenty-one segregated schools on military bases that were not effected by the president’s 
order because they were administered by local authorities with local money but on federal land.  
In a letter she wrote in early April, Secretary of HEW, Oveta Culp Hobby pointed out the 
difficulties posed by the President’s order to jointly run schools.  Exactly where federal authority 
started and state authority ended was not known.  Also, there were jurisdictional matters, not just 
between the federal and state government, but also between HEW and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) that needed to be worked out.  In conclusion she recommended delaying 
integration in the case of these schools until they had the “benefit of the Supreme Court’s 
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decision on the segregation issue.”65  This impasse, coupled with significant actions of the 
Secretary of the Navy, would prove to be critical in launching Max Rabb into civil rights work. 
On 1 June 1953, Rabb received a request from the President’s Deputy Assistant, Wilton 
Persons, asking for a suggested reply to Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem.  Powell 
had received a letter from Robert Anderson, Secretary of the Navy, defending Notice 75.  Notice 
75 was a Navy directive issued in January 1952, while Truman was still in office.  It stated that 
the naval shore establishment would remain racially segregated if “the station is subject to local 
laws of the community in which located, and the laws of the community require segregated 
facilities.”66  Anderson’s defense was similarly worded and he claimed that the Navy’s 
mission—“to maintain and improve the efficiency of Navy sea power”—depended on it.  He 
believed that integration posed a threat to that efficiency because it could lead to “disruptive 
employee relations, poor community relations, and an ultimate breakdown of efficiency 
accompanied by lower production.”  Anderson said the Navy required “whole-hearted 
cooperation [with] the shore establishment.”  That meant that the Navy would “recognize the 
customs and usages prevailing in certain geographical areas…[and would] conform with these 
customs, some of which…are backed up by law.”  He also fell back on the commonly used 
“social laboratory” theme and wrote that the Navy could not “take the initiative in dealing with 
this social problem but content itself with…gradual dissolution through…social education and 
understanding.”67  By no means was the whole U.S. military was against using the armed forces 
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to improve or change social conditions.  It is important to note that many returning World War II 
veterans took advantage of their military benefits, such as those that provided health care, 
education, and job training in order to improve themselves and society in general.         
Although President Eisenhower had not specifically given an order to either the Navy or 
the Department of Defense, Anderson erred on the wrong side of the issue.  If The President did 
not directly order integration, he certainly made no defense of segregation in the federal 
establishment.  In fact, Eisenhower had made general statements about integrating the whole 
federal establishment, which included the armed services.  Therefore unknowingly or not, 
Anderson was in defiance of the President. 
Two days later, on 3 June, Rabb and the President’s Deputy Assistant received 
information from a member of the Republican National Committee (RNC) that Anderson’s letter 
had been poorly received in the black community.  The RNC memorandum was from Val 
Washington, the minority affairs assistant and a black man himself.  It included excerpts from 
Eisenhower’s public statements promising that he would end segregation and fight to equality as 
emphasize that Eisenhower’s talk and Anderson’s actions were incompatible.  Washington also 
included newspaper clippings expressing the ire of the black community.68  Rabb now had the 
added pressure of having to salvage not only Eisenhower’s image but the party’s as well. 
  That same day, 3 June 1953, Congressman Powell of Harlem took action that pulled 
Max Rabb into the civil rights field.  Discouraged and angered by Anderson’s recalcitrance and 
by Hobby’s desire to wait on a ruling from the Supreme Court, Powell sent a telegram to the 
print media before sending it to the President, with no forewarning to Eisenhower.  The telegram 
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inflamed Eisenhower, not only because it embarrassed his administration, called into question his 
integrity, the loyalty of his subordinates and his ability to lead, but because its allegations—that 
federal institutions supporting segregation—were true.69  In his memoirs, Eisenhower recalled 
that “Max Rabb [informed him that] some government agencies were neglecting their duty.”70  
Above all else Eisenhower was personally angered by the way in which it was publicized, as an 
open telegram.  It was clearly more then a jab at the Republicans, or the Office of the President, 
or the usual partisan debunking of campaign promises.  It was a poison dart aimed straight at 
Eisenhower.  Moreover it was a deliberate act of exhibitionism.  Robert Donovan, a White House 
reporter, wrote that no story at the time ever caused such a commotion in the White House.  
Worse still was the fact that the charges of blatant insubordination proved to be correct.71 
Powell’s telegram was bold, provocative, risky and challenging.  It was very likely 
designed with the intent of provoking Eisenhower into action.  Powell wrote: 
The hour has arrived for you to assert your integrity.  You cannot continue to 
stand before two opposite moral poles…You abolished, by executive order, segregated 
schools on Army posts, [I was] assured that they were working on the abolition of 
segregation in Veterans Hospitals…[and] would look into…segregation…in Navy yards. 
 
The rest of the memorandum mentioned by name those reluctant subordinates—Hobby 
and Anderson—and characterized their actions as insubordinate and claimed that they had 
undermined the dignity, integrity and power of Eisenhower’s office.  Powell ended with an 
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appeal to the President’s “noble qualities” his “good insights, decent instincts, and strong moral 
character” and begged of him to assert strong leadership in this matter.72      
Eisenhower was willing to set aside his anger and address Powell’s concerns but first had 
to confront Powell about his insulting letter.  He sent Max Rabb to see Adam Clayton Powell.  
Within one week of the meeting between Rabb and Powell, Powell and Eisenhower had a public 
reconciliation for the ages.73  What followed in the wake of Powell’s letter was nothing short of 
amazing.  Eisenhower later wrote that in the wake of Powell’s letter he “charged Max 
[Rabb]…with the task of seeing that all that could be done in federal government was actually 
accomplished.”74   
Before taking the splinter from Eisenhower’s eye, Rabb went to take the plank from 
Powell’s.  Powell had violated protocol by not alerting the White House in advance of his 
headline-grabbing letter.  Rabb had been working integration issues along with others on the 
staff because they were regarded as largely legal issues, and Rabb was a proven lawyer with 
experience handling legislation.  He was given the title of Associate General Counsel to the 
President and began working desegregation issues and handling inquiries almost immediately.75  
Rabb had known Powell since the days when Rabb walked the corridors of Capitol Hill when he 
worked for Senators Lodge and Weeks that is likely the greatest reason why Rabb was directed 
to see Powell.  Rabb went to Powell’s office without even calling ahead or waiting to be asked 
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in.76  When Rabb walked into Powell’s office, Powell said, “Well Max, I’ve been expecting you.  
What have you got to say?”  Rabb addressing him by his first name said, “Adam, I’m ashamed of 
you.  You have done irreparable harm to the United States.”  Rabb proceeded to berate Powell 
for publicly attacking the President and sowing the seeds of animosity between the people, 
especially blacks, and the administration.  Powell said, “OK, Max, you win.  What do we do?”77   
Powell was disarmed and surprised at Rabb’s honest and straightforward manner and so 
began the negotiations between them.  Rabb convinced Powell that Eisenhower’s administration 
would be different from past administrations—which they felt had not delivered on their 
promises.  Eisenhower, Rabb explained to Powell, intended to keep his promises and 
desegregate, at least in policy, the federal establishment.  Rabb told Powell that Eisenhower 
would not seek publicity in these matters and in essence recruited Powell as an ally to work with 
the administration behind the scenes—much like Rabb himself.  Rabb asked Powell to tour 
domestic and overseas bases and to report directly to the White House.  Rabb asked only that 
Powell not publicly criticize the President.  Powell was intrigued enough to accept the offer, 
most likely because by establishing this open line of communication he would have access to the 
White House.78  This was politically satisfying to Powell because therein lay an opportunity for 
real change.  
One could imagine the allure of a black Democratic Congressman having his voice heard 
in a Republican held White House.  E. Frederic Morrow, the only other minority staff member in 
the White House, once said that Rabb was “very suave” and an able man who could “really 
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butter people up.”79  Morrow, who did not always agree with Rabb’s method, could not argue 
with his results.  If his description of Rabb is not entirely complimentary it is because it reflected 
his own inability to persuade Powell.  Whatever else he may have said to Powell, Rabb won him 
over and arranged for the President to send a candid reply to which Powell would write a 
conciliatory letter in response.80 
  Rabb began the letter immediately upon returning from Powell’s office.  Robert 
Donovan called the final letter, “a model of political artful-dodging.”  The letter disarmed critics 
by admitting that the administration had lapsed somewhat in its attention to the problem of 
segregation in the military and federally controlled institutions but promised not to “take a single 
backward step.”81  The President wrote Powell, “I shall continue to devote my earnest and 
unrelenting efforts to advance the frontiers of equality and I am confident that the fight to 
achieve this objective will be marked by increasing success.”  The letter expressed a deep 
commitment to address racial discrimination in every way Powell had described.82  Rabb’s 
liaison with Powell and his authority to broker arrangements, speak for the President, and invoke 
his intent and will are clear signs of the trust and confidence that Eisenhower had in Rabb.  That 
Eisenhower let Rabb begin writing public letters for him is also a sign of great trust and a first 
step on the path to becoming his proxy. 
In return Powell gushed at the President’s response.  He told the President that previously 
his confidence in him had been personal but that, after this great promise, his confidence in him 
was as President.  Powell called Eisenhower’s letter “a Magna Carta for minorities and [a] 
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second Emancipation Proclamation.”  Clearly the hyperbole of this letter was meant to 
overcompensate for the severity of Powell’s first letter in which he directly questioned 
Eisenhower’s ability to lead.  Powell then suggested a slate of topics that Eisenhower as the 
Chief Executive could take without judicial or legislative action.  Specifically, Powell mentioned 
extending the life of two of Truman’s creations, the Government Contracts Compliance 
Committee and Fair Employment Practices Commission.  Powell also wanted greater black 
representation in the State Department, desegregation in naval shipyards, and a halt to the flow 
of federal money towards segregated housing projects.83  With that letter Powell became an 
Eisenhower ally and ended the public catharsis. 
Powell’s account differs slightly from Rabb’s, but not in any significant way.  Powell 
claims that Eisenhower instructed Rabb to call a “special Cabinet meeting” over the letter.  It is 
easy to believe that this was an accident of memory and that Powell, who had worked with Rabb 
for so long, came to remember Rabb as always having been the Cabinet Secretary—a position he 
later earned as a result of this episode.84  Powell admitted to Rabb that he had violated protocol 
but said that he was angry at the demonstrated intransigence of Eisenhower’s appointees.  
Powell’s account did not contradict Rabb’s version of the meeting and actually supports Rabb’s 
assertiveness.  He said Rabb told him, “I tell you what you do: The President is going to write 
you a letter and I want you to reply in a complimentary way and from here we walk together.  
We have received orders to do everything within reason to wipe out segregation and 
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discrimination in the Federal government.”85  Powell’s account describes Rabb as neither a bully 
nor an Eisenhower cheerleader, but as a team builder, one willing to seek a way forward towards 
progress, cutting through the hyperbole and seeking a quite resolution to the conflict. 
It was Max Rabb’s hand that wrote the President’s letter and his fingerprints are evident 
in Powell’s return letter as well.  That Powell suggested places where the President should take 
action without Congressional approval can be taken as proof that Rabb had thoroughly 
convinced him of Eisenhower’s approach to governance and civil rights.  Eisenhower would take 
action where he had authority—all federal locations and activities.  In order to avoid more public 
battles and embarrassment between Powell and Eisenhower, whom Rabb dubbed “the odd 
couple,” Rabb must have approved the slate of topics that Powell in turn recommended that the 
President take on.  It seems inconceivable that after such a personal reckoning between Rabb and 
Powell, and the very staged and calculated responses between Powell and Eisenhower, Powell 
would push the envelope with the administration and suggest controversial action, or that Rabb 
would let him. 
With Powell assuaged and preparing to tour military installations, Rabb paid the Navy a 
visit.  He met with Secretary of the Navy Robert Anderson on June 11, 1953, the day after 
Powell’s second letter to the President.  Rabb left no record of what he thought the outcome of 
the meeting with Anderson would be.  However, Rabb had strong reason to believe that 
Secretary Anderson was going to be obstinate and would defend the Navy’s practices.  Just a few 
days earlier, in open violation of Eisenhower’s intentions, Anderson had defended his 
predecessor’s position of segregation on naval bases.  Anderson was not likely to be easily 
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moved.   At the heart of the issue was Notice 75, the Navy directive issued in January 1952, 
approving an accommodation with segregation, still in effect when Eisenhower assumed office.     
Rabb knew Anderson’s position and, the fact that he was a Texas Democrat gave Rabb 
more cause for concern.86  However Rabb’s greatest cause for concern was the very guidance 
that Rabb had for Anderson, for in it possibly lay the seeds of failure.  Rabb told Anderson 
exactly what Eisenhower told Rabb.  Rabb delivered the following words: 
President Eisenhower says he wants segregation at the bases to be terminated.  
This is the solution he wants, unless there really is some reason that really makes this 
impossible.  He’ll accept it, but he hopes you’ll come up with a decision to end 
segregation.87   
Rabb’s message left no doubt what Eisenhower’s preferred outcome was, but in no way 
did Eisenhower give a direct order to end segregation.  Eisenhower was leaving a door open that 
the Navy could walk through if Anderson so chose.  One could imagine Anderson, who just days 
earlier had written to the White House defending the segregation of naval yards, using those very 
same defenses against Rabb.  Anderson was fully aware of Eisenhower’s promises and his stated 
intent of desegregating all federal activities.   
The short but vigorous history of opposition to Presidential promises about continuing the 
integration of the military started with Truman.  This all changed when Rabb began handling the 
issue.  General Eisenhower had been a part of that resistance.  Thus, Anderson’s recalcitrance 
was just the latest in a line of dissenting military officials.  In fact Anderson had inherited the 
policies of Notice 75, meaning that at least one previous secretary had defied a President.  
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Despite inheriting the policy, Anderson promulgated it and by doing so made it his own.  What 
chance did civil rights leaders stand against people like Anderson who resisted the President?  
Nonetheless it was Rabb who was able to continue and finish the integration of the armed forces.  
Sherman Adams, Rabb’s boss for over five years in the White House, later praised Rabb for his 
work in ending naval segregation.  He said, “Rabb had a way of taking the listener into his 
confidence and getting him to share the problem at hand with a sympathetic understanding.  
After a talk with Rabb, the Texas-born Robert Anderson…promptly abolished segregation…in 
the navy yards.”88  Rabb’s vigorous efforts may have even changed Eisenhower’s mind. 
Anderson’s reaction leaves very little doubt that Rabb had convinced him to desegregate 
the naval shore establishment.  He called in Under Secretary of the Navy Charles Thomas and 
Rear Admiral George Holderness and ordered them to leave for Norfolk and Charleston 
respectively, that very night.  Anderson demanded that they order those installations to be 
desegregated from “top to bottom.”  He demanded a report within three days and dismissed them 
so they could commence their travel. 89 
There is no doubt that President Eisenhower’s wishes were the most powerful component 
of the discussion, but some credit must be given to Rabb who did not let Anderson escape 
through the built-in exit.  That Eisenhower did not order desegregation, that he only desired and 
hoped for it, and that he left an opportunity to continue segregation can be attributed to many 
things.  Eisenhower’s military experience taught him how volatile of an issue race was in the 
military and his experience in the Truman administration only reinforced his beliefs.  Although 
he wanted all second-class citizenship wiped out, he was possibly afraid that the Navy’s 
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assessment of its shore establishment was correct.  Anderson’s sudden cooperation can be solely 
attributed to the pressure that Cabinet and sub-Cabinet members are under.  They serve at the 
pleasure of the President and can be asked to resign at any moment.  However, the speed at 
which he moved to integrate the Navy can be attributed to Rabb’s management of the problem.  
Someone less sympathetic to integration could easily have delivered a soft, or deliberately 
confused explanation of Eisenhower’s intent, thereby creating an opportunity to continue 
segregation or proceed slowly.  Furthermore, the delivery to Anderson cannot be viewed apart 
from Rabb’s grander scheme with Powell.  However, there is no indication that Rabb discussed 
with Anderson the President’s arrangement with Powell.  There is little doubt that, if both 
meetings are taken together, Rabb all but closed the door on Anderson, the Navy and 
segregation. 
A few days after Rabb’s visit with Secretary Anderson, Rabb wrote to the Assistant to the 
President, Sherman Adams, in order to close out the Powell episode.  The letter is nothing short 
of Rabb’s action plan.  The letter addressed Powell’s issues, which, as it happened, were now 
aligned with President Eisenhower’s stated position of taking action where he could.  He wrote 
to Adams that “it certainly clears the air for trust and confidence in the President’s program.”  
Although Rabb does not say between whom, Rabb most likely meant that between Powell and 
Eisenhower things would be easier as each now understood the other a little better.  Then he 
commented on the state of each of Powell’s suggestions.  Addressing Powell’s request that the 
Fair Employment Practices Commission be continued, Rabb wrote: 
The only real action that it requires is to take out the weak over-age members of 
the present Board and substitute in their places strong nationally known individuals who 
will give stature to the commission.  I will prepare a list of possible appointees and advise 
you soon. 
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 Rabb again revealed his talent and desire to make progress in civil rights by putting the 
right people into positions where they could make a difference.  Rabb had also already been hard 
at work on the second of Truman’s commissions that Eisenhower would continue to support, the 
President’s Committee on Government Contract Compliance.  This one would help President 
Eisenhower score one of the greatest victories of his civil rights, the desegregation of 
Washington D.C.  Rabb wrote:  I have been spending a great deal of time bringing this one into 
shape and I believe we will come out in the next three or four days with a proposition that will be 
a great advance on the present Committee. 
This committee also benefited greatly from Rabb’s involvement.  The work of both 
committees attacked segregation in the federal government.   Rabb would spend a great deal of 
time on both, but his immediate concern was the military establishment.  Although it was too 
early to claim a victory with the Navy, Rabb had a confident report for Adams about the Navy’s 
progress.  He wrote: 
I conferred with Secretary Anderson [and others]…at the Pentagon…last 
Thursday.  They are now prepared to change their approach…[they] made visits to 
Norfolk and Charleston on Friday, and are prepared to report progress.  Anderson called 
on Saturday to ask if you would be good enough to see Under Secretary Thomas today so 
that he can report on such immediate steps as they can take to implement the President’s 
policy.90 
   
Rabb’s visit with the Navy undoubtedly made an impression on their senior leadership.  
That Secretary Anderson felt that he needed to render a day-by-day account to Rabb and that he 
wanted Under Secretary Thomas to report on the problem as early as Monday following their 
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Thursday meeting is proof of Anderson’s newly found belief in integration.  Rabb also believed 
very early in the process that the Navy was doing more than investigating the possibility of 
desegregation; otherwise he would not have written that they were prepared to change their 
approach.  
  Undersecretary Thomas did not see Sherman Adams that day or even that week.  Instead 
he documented his findings in a memorandum to the President.  In it he reviewed his personal 
history with the problem of segregation in the military when he served under Secretary of the 
Navy James Forrestal.  He recounted his position that integration would ruin cohesion in the 
Marine Corps because of “the closeness of their units.”  Thomas had been strongly in favor of 
the status quo during the war.  He further told Eisenhower how he had recommended to 
Roosevelt that equality could not be forced by either law or directive but had to come through 
evolution.  Eisenhower clearly understood these arguments as he had once also espoused them.  
Yet, after just one face-to-face meeting with Rabb, Thomas expressed optimism about the 
possibility of change, even though his boss had written a vigorous defense of Notice 75 just ten 
days earlier.  Whatever other changes Thomas may have experienced are unknown, but what is 
known is that one meeting with Rabb was enough to make him question and possibly revise his 
previous opinion. 
After his trip to Norfolk, Thomas, it appeared, now believed integration was possible.  
The memorandum began by acknowledging the meeting between Rabb and Secretary Anderson 
as cause for the whole review of naval shipyards.  This statement can be taken as tacit, if not 
outright, acknowledgement that Rabb convinced the senior leadership of the Navy how serious 
the President was about this issue.  It also mentioned that Powell was the instigator of the whole 
affair and mentioned him as an “agitator.” Thomas’ willingness to criticize Powell, and pass on 
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criticisms of Powell, suggests that Rabb had not shared with Anderson or others the arrangement 
he made with Powell.  Thomas was very likely expressing resentment at being confronted with 
institutional change.  Had he known of the arrangement with Powell, Thomas would not have 
risked being openly insubordinate of the President’s authority.    
Thomas reported that the Navy could handle integration but he identified three areas of 
potential trouble—drinking fountains, toilets, and eating areas.  He recommended taking down 
the signs that labeled each fountain as white or colored.  Then “within a reasonable time” signs 
from the toilets.  Finally after those two changes had been absorbed by the shipyard workers, 
cafeterias were to be integrated.  Thomas believed that within six months integration could be 
fully realized.  He concluded by adding that Admiral Holderness had toured naval facilities in 
Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina and that he had found social conditions on which 
integration could depend to be similar.91   
Rabb’s initial visit to the Department of the Navy was later followed up by other 
meetings.  Rabb continued to have a voice and presence in the on-going dialogue and action 
associated with naval desegregation.  He communicated directly with Secretary Anderson’s 
military aide, Captain R.D. “Tobie” Hogle, who it appears ensured that Rabb was kept up to date 
on the Navy’s  progress.  Hogle wrote Rabb on one occasion, “The luncheon with you last 
Thursday was most enjoyable.  You were very kind to think of me and I deeply appreciate it.”  In 
the return letter Rabb told Hogle, “I want you to come over here many times, and don’t be 
surprised if I take you up some time on your invitation to come over to the Pentagon.”  Later 
Hogle sent Rabb an advance copy of a progress report with charts “indicating the present status 
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of segregation among various naval establishments,” reminding him that it was the chart he 
“discussed with [him] on [his] last visit.”92   
Rabb had already established “inside” relationships similar to the one with Hogle as a 
result of the visit with Powell.  These actions demonstrated that Rabb was serious about 
delivering on Eisenhower’s promises to end segregation in the Navy.  It also meant that Rabb 
subscribed fully to Eisenhower’s way of handling things discreetly and without fanfare.  By 
forging these vital inside relationships Rabb was not breaking the rules.  These were the rules.  
These were the accepted norms of a privileged few who could directly access the powerful all 
across the government.  Rabb, just one man, was in essence doing the work of Truman’s Fahy 
Committee, and doing it with much less noise, friction and open controversy.  He had the same 
presidential aura of importance as that committee albeit without the formal writ which allowed 
his to operate discreetly.  Furthermore, establishing such amicable ties allowed Rabb to “keep in 
touch” with the issues over time and get faster results.  Rabb facilitated integration rather than 
mandating it, which allowed the naval leadership to believe they were controlling the pace of 
change when in fact Rabb kept steady pressure on the navy to maintain progress.  The following 
development is an example of that steady but indirect pressure.   
The Chief of Naval Personnel delivered a progress report to Secretary Anderson, in 
September 1953, outlining the way ahead for the navy.  In his letter to Anderson, Admiral J.L. 
Holloway described how he was going to dismantle the last vestiges of segregation in the 
Navy—the steward’s branch.  Stewards were the cooks and dining attendants in the naval 
messes.  The steward’s branch was a particularly contested area for civil rights leader Lester 
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and correspondence with Captain R.D. Hogle, Military Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.  The letters between 
Hogle and Rabb suggest Rabb dealt directly with the Secretary via Hogle rather than through the Office of the 
Secretary of the Navy or its subordinate agencies.    
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Granger, Executive Director of the National Urban League, former advisor to Secretary of the 
Navy Forrestal and currently to Secretary Anderson.  A diligent subordinate, Holloway informed 
Anderson that Granger was meeting with him (Anderson) on 3 September, 1953, and that he 
wished to see Anderson before that meeting to discuss the Navy’s action plan.  The next sentence 
in the memorandum demonstrates conclusively that Rabb’s involvement in this issue was 
causing undeniable progress in U.S. civil rights and race relations:  “Parenthetically, I note that 
Mr. Max Rabb’s office is calling Mr. Granger’s office on Wednesday, the 2nd, expressing the 
hope that Mr. Granger will drop by the White House after Mr. Granger’s luncheon with you on 
Thursday.”93   
Such contemporary awareness of Rabb’s movements is an indication of his importance in 
this matter.  Not only did he deliver Eisenhower’s message, but his name appears on at least two 
occasions in high-level memoranda.  It was known that he maintained an open line of 
communication with Secretary Anderson through Anderson’s aide and that he was 
simultaneously in touch with prominent members of civil rights organizations.  All this indicates 
that the navy was managing to satisfy Rabb’s standard of desegregation.  He was the bridge to 
the White House for both the Navy and civil rights organizations.  He was by this time 
Eisenhower’s proxy on the issue.  This was exactly how Rabb wanted to be regarded.  He knew 
that he had the President’s full backing and that the President was not so interested in the 
iterative correspondence, just final results.  Official reports were of course still directed to the 
President and not Rabb, but no doubt Rabb reviewed them in advance.   Certainly naval officials 
must have known that any grumblings Granger had would be passed to Rabb.  This explains, in 
part, the aggressive nature of Holloway’s plan to integrate the stewards’ branch.  He planned to 
                                                 
93 Memorandum, Vice Admiral J.L. Holloway, Chief of Naval Personnel to Anderson, 1 September 1953, in Nalty 
and MacGregor, Essential Documents, 304-305. 
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stop recruiting blacks directly for that duty.  In order to do that he had to change the entire naval 
system of recruitment.  He wrote: 
I am considering ceasing for the time being at least separate initial recruitment in 
the steward’s branch…under these circumstances, I would enlist all in the continental 
United States as seaman recruits, and assign to Stewardsman School, on a volunteer basis 
only after completion of recruit training.94    
The exceptions to this rule were Filipinos, whom the Navy would still target for direct 
service as stewards.  Despite this exception, the change in naval policy was massive, sweeping 
and clearly a sign of both progress and Rabb’s influence.  It certainly did not prevent blacks from 
testing into or volunteering for the stewards’ branch, but it also allowed them to qualify for other 
positions.  That the Navy was willing to overhaul its recruiting and training is a clear indication 
that there would no longer be any policy barriers for blacks.       
The Navy was not the only group tracking its civil rights progress.  By September of 
1953, within three months of Secretary Anderson’s edict to desegregate naval shipyards, a local 
field office of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) wrote 
a glowing note to Clarence Mitchell, Director of the Washington Bureau of the NAACP.  He in 
turn forwarded the note to Rabb.  The field director wrote: 
The walls are really tumbling down, signs are being taken down all over the 
Naval Yard and the Naval Base…almost daily…the signs [are] being taken down in 
various shops.  The signs are removed for the most part on Saturday…they will not just 
paint out the signs but rather…paint the whole side of the a building or of a room and of 
                                                 
94 Vice Admiral J.L. Holloway, Chief of Naval Personnel to Anderson, 1 September 1953, in Nalty and MacGregor, 
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course forget to paint the words “White” and “Colored” on the side of the room or 
building.  The whole matter is very pleasing to the men and women in the installations.95 
 
In September, after praise from the black press, Val Washington of the RNC wrote Rabb 
to acknowledge his role in helping the Republican Party keeps its promise to blacks.  
Washington wrote, “If the Eisenhower Administration continues to show the friendly and 
cooperative attitudes towards Negro problems in the future that it has in the past, Negroes will 
come back to the Party without Max Rabb [and] Val Washington.”96  This note obviously 
suggests that Val Washington believed that Rabb’s work in completing military integration had 
done much for the image of the party and, of course for blacks to whom they had promised as 
much.  Though complimentary of Rabb, this statement was the product of wishful thinking.  
Washington was expressing the hope that Eisenhower himself, not his proxy, would continue to 
take a strong stance in this area.   However, Eisenhower’s short but successful record owed most 
to Rabb’s representing him in this area. 
In November Secretary Anderson submitted his first full report to the White House.  In it 
he cited the August progress report, the one sent to Rabb, as a source of comparison to tout the 
progress that followed from his own order to desegregate naval shipyards.  In August, 42 
shipyards in the South submitted initial reports.  Twenty of those initially reported they had no 
segregated facilities.  The 22 remaining shipyards in the South reported “all” or “some” facilities 
segregated. By November only one, Charleston, South Carolina, reported “some” facilities as 
segregated. More importantly, it seemed that the dam had broken and the U.S. Navy was really 
pushing hard for integration.  Of the naval facilities reporting for the first time in November, 
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only one of the eighteen reported “some” facilities as segregated.  It was in Newport News, 
Virginia and the subject of a later letter to Rabb.97      
Thus encouraged by this amazing progress the President issued a press release to 
announce the results of the report.  So it was with a good amount of confidence that the President 
announced “that the Navy’s policy of non-segregation is completely effective.”  Saying that is 
not the same thing as saying that the Navy was no longer segregated.  He knew that it still was, 
but that it was also well on its way towards complete integration, in policy if not yet in practice.  
The President congratulated the Navy on its progress and said it was an “accomplishment of 
which we all can be proud…a job very well done indeed.”98 
Just after the President’s press release, Clarence Mitchell sent Rabb a copy of a letter he 
had written to Secretary Anderson in which he called Anderson’s action “a significant chapter in 
our country’s history.”  So much progress had been accomplished that he was reduced to making 
just one substantive complaint—concerning separate washrooms located on non-federal property 
at the Naval facility in Newport News, a matter mentioned in Anderson’s report to the 
President.99   
Rewards, Conclusions, and a New Title 
In the middle of handling this major and ground breaking issue, Eisenhower’s White 
House staff was taking a new shape.  In October 1953 the President bestowed on Rabb a great 
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honor.  He made Rabb the first ever Secretary to the Cabinet. 100  This was a position Eisenhower 
created to bring order to Cabinet affairs, especially the meetings.101  This great honor for Rabb 
was coincident with his recent success and role in helping to end naval segregation and in 
recruiting Powell.  In addition to this affair, Rabb’s correspondence with Sherman Adams 
indicated he was working on other open issues related to civil rights and race relations.102  Rabb 
was also negotiating on another issue of personal and Presidential importance to Eisenhower, 
revising the McCarran-Walter Act in order to allow a greater number of immigrants to enter the 
United States from Communist nations.   This author suggests that Eisenhower rewarded him 
with this position of authority because of his demonstrated potential for greater responsibility 
based on past performance.  Rabb was simply brilliant in Eisenhower’s first year.  Eisenhower 
later wrote in his memoirs, “because of Mr. Rabb’s apparent enthusiasm and appetite for work, I 
later assigned him an additional duty, as Staff Secretary for the Cabinet.”103    
The letter that Mitchell sent to Rabb about the Newport News washroom contained a very 
important point that crossed over into the issue of school integration on federal property.  
Mitchell called for one federal policy in cases where federal activities used local or private 
resources.  Otherwise local communities could deny American citizens their basic rights by 
superseding federal laws.  This gray area was of course the same issue that HEW and the 
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Department of Defense were facing with respect to schools and one for which the administration 
had no answer.  Rabb’s work to integrate the Navy and its shore establishment proved that there 
was a way to solve the problem—Newport News washrooms being the only exception.   
Public schools on military installations run by the armed forces were integrated by the 
fall of 1953, a nine-month anticipation of the Brown decision and many more years before actual 
integration in many places in the South.  As in the case of the Newport News washroom, schools 
on federal land or on nearby local land but operated by local authorities posed a real dilemma.  
There was much debate within the administration regarding the possibility of forcing these types 
of schools to comply with the President’s order.  Assuming those school districts were willing to 
comply, they would be in open violation of state laws which required segregation.104  Secretary 
Hobby of HEW favored waiting to “act” until the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the 
Brown case.105   
Charles E. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, suddenly ended the impasse.  In yet another 
act which anticipated the Brown decision, the Department of Defense (DOD) took an aggressive 
approach.  Wilson declared that all schools located on military property would be integrated by 
September 1955.  He directed that every effort be made to comply with the President’s directive, 
and with the firm support of the service secretaries the armed services all made the deadline.  
Furthermore, no new school under construction would be operated on a segregated basis either. 
106  Even though the Brown decision had been handed down before Wilson’s established 
deadline, greatly facilitating the order, the fact remains that the DOD took the initiative.  
Although integration became the norm on military installations as of the 1955-1956 school year 
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on military, off-post integration still remained a controversial problem.  Nevertheless, Wilson’s 
bold action was praised by black leaders.  Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, 
called the decision “another milestone…in making America more truly democratic.”107 
By all appearances it seemed that there was a rift between the DOD and HEW in the 
matter of school integration on military installations.  In order to avoid such perceptions and 
perhaps to assuage the upstaged Hobby, Secretary Wilson issued a statement indicating 
otherwise.  He wrote: 
There is absolutely no truth to [the] stories…that the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare has opposed integrated schools on military bases.  Quite to the 
contrary.  There has never been any difference of opinion between the President, Mrs. 
Hobby or myself regarding what should be done nor any dragging of feet by any of us in 
regard to this matter. 
 
Secretary Wilson closed his letter by promising the American public that both HEW and 
the DOD would work towards full integration by September 1955.108 
The curtain also quickly fell on segregation in the Veterans Administration (VA).  The 
new Secretary was Harvey Highly, whom Rabb described as “a dyed-in-the-wool Republican 
who never had any interest in civil rights.”  Rabb believed that he might even have gotten his 
position because he was a close friend of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy.  Despite his 
political allegiances, Highly quickly complied once Rabb “gave him his directions.”  It seems 
very likely that Rabb had a meeting with Highly similar to the one he held with Anderson.  
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Highly’s actions suggest he was similarly influenced.  Rabb said “he went right down the line in 
record time, as he was told.”  In all, 47 VA facilities were desegregated.109      
Successfully managing the consequences of the fall-out of the Powell telegram made 
Rabb a rising star in the White House.  It is likely a reason, if not the reason, why Eisenhower 
made him the Secretary to the Cabinet.  Robert Anderson’s subsequent success following naval 
integration is a clue to Rabb’s ascension as well.  
To Eisenhower, Anderson’s actions were completely in accordance with Eisenhower’s 
own way of doing business.  He was thrilled that only the final results were publicized and not 
any of the acrimonious debates or negativity associated with the issue.  Anderson did it 
discreetly, and quietly and without drawing the attention of pro-segregationists.   
Eisenhower was very impressed at how Secretary Anderson handled the integration of the 
Navy.  He wrote: 
His response was so immediate and so decisive as to excite my intense 
admiration, a feeling for him which has grown ever since.  With no fanfare—in fact, with 
much care to avoid making an open issue of things—segregation was soon completely 
and almost painlessly eliminated at all naval installations.110 
 
As a reward for his performance, the President made Secretary Anderson the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense in May 1954, a position he held until August 1955.  The President then 
made him Secretary of the Treasury in July 1957, a post he held until the end of the Eisenhower 
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Presidency.111  Rabb said, “Robert Anderson became the great favorite of President Eisenhower” 
and that Eisenhower continually mentioned him as possible nominee for President.  Eisenhower 
considered Anderson a candidate for president in 1956, but when Eisenhower decided to run for 
reelection he considered Anderson to replace Richard Nixon on the1956 ticket.112  He also 
thought that Anderson should be Nixon’s running mate in 1960.113  Rabb believed that 
Eisenhower’s esteem for Anderson “all grew out of this particular incident.”114   Rabb—like 
Anderson—earned the esteem of Eisenhower and used the success of this event to continue 
improving his record within the Administration.  Anderson’s sudden good fortune may even 
explain why Secretary Wilson suddenly broke the deadlock between DOD and HEW.  Wilson’s 
guidance to desegregate schools that served military dependents was so swift and unexpected 
that it appeared that the DOD was at odds with HEW.  Perhaps Wilson became encouraged by 
his subordinate’s success, or even jealous of it.115  Maybe he believed that by going “one up” on 
HEW and Secretary Hobby, he could earn political capital and ingratiate himself with the 
President as Anderson had.  Though no evidence exists, it would not have been beyond Rabb to 
have met with Wilson about this.  At any rate the timing of his decision cannot be dismissed as 
simply an uncoordinated development.  It is very possible that in addition to those other factors, 
he simply succumbed to the momentum of change that Rabb had caused.116        
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As of October 1953 Max Rabb conducted business with the greatest title he ever held—
Secretary of the Cabinet—a title and position of unprecedented authority and reach.  Henceforth, 
when Rabb worked on issues, negotiated outcomes, and brokered deals, he did so as the Cabinet 
Secretary.  He was no longer a compartmentalized unofficial minority rights advisor, Assistant to 
the Assistant to the President or Associate Counsel to the President.  From that point on, the fact 
that Rabb was asking for something meant that he represented the whole Cabinet.  This was how 
Max Rabb ushered in two revolutionary periods of change in the Eisenhower Administration. 
Through the skillful and deliberate use of his new office Rabb was able to score victory after 
victory not just for minority groups but for all Americans.  No one appreciated his work more 
than Eisenhower, on whose behalf he was tallying victories.   
By completing the desegregation of the military Eisenhower preempted social change.  
Inasmuch as the military is part of the Federal Government, desegregation in the military also 
triggered massive reforms within the government.  Desegregating the whole military 
establishment including schools, VA hospitals, and naval shipyards, led to a natural and gradual 
transition into other federal areas of jurisdiction, like Washington D.C.  Max Rabb’s work as 
Eisenhower’s anointed proxy was essential to completing this vital work.  Of his contributions 
Eisenhower wrote, “Thereupon, at my personal request, Max Rabb set about to track down any 
inconsistencies of this sort in the rest of the departments and agencies of the government.”117 
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CHAPTER 2 - Organizing the Organizations of 
Government                            
Max Rabb Brings Order to the White House 
In contrast to the all-in-one role of messenger, enforcer, and proxy that Max Rabb played 
in desegregating the military, Rabb’s participation within the Eisenhower White House was 
chiefly as an organizational leader.  In this role Rabb’s ability to exert influence became more 
direct as he acted less as a proxy and more as an executive.  This is not to suggest that Rabb was 
an executive or that he invoked the President’s authority but rather that he became more of a 
director of action than an action officer himself.  Though he never abandoned the latter method, 
the former indicates a greater range of skills that allowed him to address more issues through the 
work of others.  Rabb’s ability to influence others was enhanced by his new role as Secretary to 
the Cabinet, which gave him access to all the issues of the government and all the policy makers 
in the Executive branch. Although only his Secretariat reported directly to him, Rabb, 
nonetheless, was able to influence many of the organizations within the White House to advance 
minority rights.   This chapter will examine how Max Rabb channeled his energy into directing 
others and creating organizations through which he could access the power of the White House 
and the whole Eisenhower administration to advance the cause of civil rights.  The result was a 
record of organizational achievements for progress in race relations and civil rights. 
The first year of the Eisenhower administration was a time of great change within the 
White House.  Cabinet members had to be carefully scrutinized and confirmed.  Gabriel Hauge, a 
trusted advisor to Eisenhower, first recognized the need to quickly organize the procedures of the 
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Cabinet and the White House Staff.  Additionally, Hauge recommended that one staff member 
should be dedicated to organizing the future Presidential records for archival purposes.118  All 
the staff members and White House personnel set about trying to define their roles in the ne
administration and adapt to the President’s style.  Sherman Adams recounted the chaos of the 
early days.  He wrote that the staff was largely composed of those loyal and veteran members of 
the Eisenhower campaign who worked out of Denver and in the Commodore Hotel, New York 
City, after the election.  What was less clear were the “designations of titles and terms of 
reference as to what their duties were going to be.”
w 
                                                
119  The new and growing staff lacked office 
space.  Adams described the need for space as “insurmountable.”  The White House was overrun 
with requests for patronage from the Republican Party.120  Rabb was given the “special duty of 
acting as trouble shooter on…minority problems” early in the administration, but there were no 
established relationships, offices, ranks, or lines of authority through which to work. 121  As a 
dutiful member of the staff, Rabb set out to establish clear lines of authority, defining how the 
staff would relate to each other.  In some cases creating these organizations and relationships 
within the Eisenhower government proved vital and indispensable to Rabb’s “extra duty” as the 
civil rights and minority problems trouble shooter.  In other cases these organizations were the 
natural result of maturation within the White House Staff and Presidential Administration.  In 
either case Rabb served in these organizations—creating and shaping some himself—because of 
his work in race relations and civil rights.  Without them Rabb would forever be the lone 
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operator who took on Adam Clayton Powell, the Navy and VA, but have no reach beyond his 
own personal presence. 
Max Rabb’s employment history within the White House was complicated and nuanced.  
No matter what capacity Rabb acted in the one constant for Rabb was that his immediate boss in 
the White House was Sherman Adams.  Adams recalled that Rabb came to the White House 
from the onset of the Eisenhower Administration “to serve originally as my assistant, 
specializing in minority group problems.”122  Rabb’s account agreed with Adams on one of the 
two points.  Rabb said he served as an assistant to Adams, but that he did not concentrate on civil 
rights.  Rabb further said that he was simultaneously Eisenhower’s Associate General 
Counsel.123  Eisenhower corroborated Rabb’s assertion that he was his counsel—a fact not 
mentioned by Adams—and also verified Adams claim that Rabb worked on minority rights.  
Eisenhower wrote, referring to the integration of the federal government, that his “Associate 
Counsel, Max Rabb,” informed him “that some government agencies were neglecting their 
duties.”  He further wrote that Rabb “also served as Special Assistant in charge of minority 
affairs.”124  Rabb never denied working minority affairs, or civil rights, but he claimed that he 
was not brought into the administration to work on these problems.  Yet, Adams and Eisenhower 
seem to remember him most for this and less for principal duty as Secretary of the Cabinet.   
Of the different duties Rabb had, Secretary to the Cabinet was the last duty he assumed—
in October 1953.  This may be why he is least remembered for this role.  The gap of 
understanding in Rabb’s roles was further widened and complicated once he became the Cabinet 
Secretary.  Eisenhower said he assigned Rabb “an additional duty, as the Staff Secretary for the 
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Cabinet.”125  Eisenhower’s statement does not lend importance to the historical and 
unprecedented new title and role he bestowed on Rabb.  What was to Eisenhower “an additional 
duty” was to Rabb “more than full time job.”  Rabb also recalled that “whatever I did on civil 
rights was, to be sure, a tremendous additional burden on my time.”126  Eisenhower seemed to 
put the Secretariat on par with Rabb’s unofficial duty—that of minority rights advisor.  To 
further complicate Rabb’s role in the White House was the fact that Sherman Adams’ office, 
White House Chief of Staff, assumed the level of a Cabinet level department under Eisenhower.  
Inasmuch as Rabb was his assistant, Rabb, too, could then be considered an “Undersecretary” or 
“Assistant Secretary.”  Furthermore, even though Adams was his superior, Rabb’s office—at 
least in theory—could assign Adams’ office the same types of tasks that he could assign the 
other departments and agencies.  Though complicated and highly nuanced all these roles actually 
served to enhance Rabb’s reputation rather than confuse the situation.  They ultimately prove his 
incredible versatility and the wide range of problems he could solve.    
Max Rabb and the Appointment Committee          
President Eisenhower’s time was the first concern of the different staffs within the White 
House.127  Sherman Adams created the President’s Appointment Committee, more commonly 
known as the “calendar committee,” to budget Eisenhower’s time and prioritize his requirements.  
Adams appointed Rabb to serve on this committee along with several other primary staff 
members such as James Hagerty, the Press Secretary.128  The committee’s main task was to 
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balance all of the President’s potential appearances in and outside of the White House and 
respond to the thousands of requests for appointment and visits.129  John Foster Dulles, the 
Secretary of State, decided when and where the President would make foreign trips, but the 
Appointment Committee tracked those items so as to avoid conflicts in the schedule.  Rabb did 
triple duty on this committee because of three of his roles in the administration—assistant to 
Adams, Cabinet Secretary and minority rights advisor.  Rabb’s overlapping responsibilities on 
this committee made one of the greatest moments in civil rights history possible.   
Max Rabb’s herculean effort to bring about President Eisenhower’s historic meeting of 
June 23, 1958, with the most prominent black leaders of the day is an example of how he used 
the organizations within the White House to advance civil rights.  E. Frederic Morrow began 
suggesting the idea to Rabb as early as early January of 1955.130  Morrow began steadily 
petitioning Rabb for a meeting after the murder of Emmett Till, when the black community in 
the South was besieged by a wave of terror.131  Till’s murder in many ways signaled a change in 
the behavior of the black community, which was to peak in the next decade.  From that moment 
on, blacks refused to be passive and patience was out of the question.  Morrow warned Rabb of 
“visible indications that [they were] on the verge of a dangerous racial conflagration in the 
South.”  Morrow believed that even a meeting with just Adams or the Vice-President could 
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suffice.132  Morrow suggested the idea again in April 1956, when a similar group petitioned for a 
meeting to discuss resistance to integrating public schools.  It was dismissed at the time but Rabb 
was convinced it was a good idea and tried to arrange a meeting in August—to no avail.133  
Morrow thought it was of utmost importance for the black community to see some sign from the 
White House that it was concerned about increasingly strained race relations in the South.  
Morrow and Rabb tried selling the meeting to the staff by arguing that it was in the 
interest of the Republican Party to reach out to blacks.  Morrow wrote “that the White House has 
consistently turned down any suggestions by Max and me that a meeting of whites and Negroes 
be held under the auspices of the White House to discuss the problem.”  Rabb even tried to make 
the meeting seem less frightening to those who opposed it by making it a meeting of Southern 
educators, white and black, instead of civil rights leaders.134  However, 1956 was an election 
year and Eisenhower was not going to risk any political catastrophes by having a meeting that 
would certainly alienate an already troubled Southern base of support.     
Eisenhower was safely reelected in 1956, and in 1957 Rabb remained undeterred in 
seeking to arrange the meeting.  He knew however, that the timing had to be precise.  Through 
pure coincidence, on 5 March 1957, Martin Luther King Jr., encountered Vice-President Nixon 
in Ghana, Africa—both were there attending a ceremony to observe its newly awarded 
independence.  Nixon invited King to meet with him in Washington.135  The press widely 
reported the encounter.  Rabb immediately sought to capitalize on the news item by advising 
James Hagerty, the White House Press Secretary.  Rabb told him that, if the President were 
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asked about Nixon’s invitation to King to discuss “race problems in the South,” he “should 
express pleasure that this conference will take place.”  Rabb also advised Hagerty that William 
Rogers of the Department of Justice concurred with him.136    
While Rabb and Morrow continued working on a meeting with the President, black 
leaders decided to plan a march on Washington in May 1957.  It was apparent to them that the 
President was neither going to receive them nor speak out on the deplorable conditions in the 
South.137  Martin Luther King, Jr., A. Philip Randolph and Roy Wilkins of the NAACP invited 
Adam Clayton Powell to a planning session in early April.138  Rabb wrote Adams telling him 
that he had arranged for Powell to let him know what happened at the meeting.  Powell shared 
the same concerns as Rabb.  Both feared that the march could spoil Eisenhower’ chances of 
getting civil rights legislation through Congress.  Rabb also conferred with Clarence Mi
Legislative Director for the NAACP, who agreed that the Civil Rights Bill should not be 
jeopardized.  Mitchell told Rabb that the black leaders “would not concentrate their fire on the 
Executive.”
tchell, 
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correspondence between Rabb and Adams indicated the concern both men had about the 
potential damage this could have on American race relations.  Adams ordered Rabb to closely 
monitor any developments in this case.  Rabb informed him that Powell and Mitchell would 
work together “to keep the meeting under control,” but Powell was fearful that King would still 
march on Washington.141  The willingness of Powell and Mitchell to help Rabb is a great 
example of the influence and credibility that Rabb had with them.   
Rabb, Mitchell and Powell were successful in their fight to reduce the profile of the more 
frustrated black leaders who wanted a visit with the President or some presidential statement 
regarding the awful situation in the South.  The attendees of the April 5 meeting agreed to forego 
the march, instead, they would observe the third anniversary of the Supreme Court’s May 17, 
1954, landmark Brown decision.  Rabb really felt as if they had avoided disaster.  He told Adams 
that the meeting “held considerable danger” and that the administration had “too firm a hold on 
the friendship of Negroes to risk the damaging effects of a spectacular effort designed to criticize 
the President.”  Rabb further informed Adams that Powell and Mitchell had changed the 
character of the proposed march into an observance to commemorate the anniversary of the 
Brown decision through prayer.  Rabb was assured that the President would “not be adversely 
affected.”  Despite these assurances Rabb remained nervous about the possibility that this could 
turn into a demonstration of black anger and frustration.  Rabb worried that the observance might 
even be infiltrated by opportunistic communists.  He even suggested rescheduling the Cabinet 
meeting so that the Cabinet Secretaries could make themselves unavailable to appointment 
seekers, which they could not do if it were known that they were in town.142  He promised 
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Adams that he would closely monitor the situation and remain in constant contact with his team 
of allied black leaders.143  Even members of the Department of Justice agreed that the President 
should break his silence and make a plea to Congress to support his pending legislation and to 
denounce the violence in the South.144  Eisenhower made no such address.    
 Rabb continued to float “trial balloons” with the staff during that summer in order to 
arrange a meeting but the timing was never right.  Congress was pruning the President’s budget 
in May, and therefore a meeting was out of the questions until that storm passed.145  King had 
requested an appointment in May and fellow staff members asked Rabb to deal with King.  Rabb 
called him personally to tell him that the President had agreed to see him in the future, once 
Congress was adjourned and the civil rights bill was safely out of the way.  Rabb also explained 
to King that his presence would prompt Southern governors and attorneys general to seek an 
appointment with the President.  King agreed to not to press the issue and would wait to hear 
from Rabb in the near future.146  In June Herbert Brownell and President Eisenhower began 
fighting a fierce battle in Congress over the President’s proposed civil rights legislation, and 
Eisenhower did not want to further antagonize its opponents. Rabb agreed with this logic and 
told Morrow emphatically that the “civil rights bill [was] the first priority and no excuse should 
be provided for pro-segregationists to postpone action on [it].”  However, he kept steady pressure 
on Adams and the President hoping to nudge them forward and commit to a meeting. 
Rabb also reminded Morrow of another hurdle.  This type of meeting was fundamentally 
at odds with Eisenhower’s concept of balance.  Rabb argued that to privilege black leaders with 
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such a meeting would require the White House to entertain requests from Southern governors or 
attorneys general and from a whole gamut of hyphenated American ethic groups as well.  Rabb 
also advised Morrow that the administration had serious concerns about not being able to control 
what these black leaders would say in public after their meeting with the President.  They were 
especially concerned about them directly quoting the President.  Despite all this, Rabb was 
hopeful that they would have the meeting after Congress adjourned.  Presumably he meant in the 
summer, when the civil rights bill was out of the way.147  Rabb in no way wanted to threaten the 
bill, but knew that the black leaders might begin to question the sincerity of the administration 
due to the meeting being delayed.148     
These concerns however, did not preclude Nixon from meeting with King as he had 
promised.  Vice-President Nixon informed Rabb in May that he had scheduled a meeting with 
King in June and that it would not be announced publicly until later.149  Nixon and King met on 
June 13 at the Capitol.  Since the Eisenhower Administration would not speak out against the 
South, Nixon suggested that King testify before the President’s Committee on Government 
Contracts—of which he was the chairman and Rabb was an ex-officio member.150  No doubt this 
approach greatly appealed to Rabb, who wanted the black leaders to know that the Eisenhower 
Administration cared about them and yet wanted to protect Eisenhower’s legislation in Congress.  
It is very possible that Rabb suggested this approach to Nixon.  Rabb reported to Adams that 
Nixon offered to take the Contracts Committee to a city in the South, New Orleans or Atlanta, 
where King could address it, but that Nixon had rejected making an open statement about the 
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South.151  The day after this communication, Rabb forwarded to Adams a file on A. Philip 
Randolph, who had written to the White House on June 10 requesting an audience with the 
President for himself and fifteen other black leaders.  Rabb informed Adam’s secretary that the 
Calendar Committee had “given sympathetic consideration to having the President see either 2 or 
3 of the leaders” recommended by Randolph and that Randolph and King were going to be two 
of those seen.152       
Just before King met with Nixon, Morrow wrote to Adams to sum up how black 
Americans felt about the President not granting King, Randolph and others an audience.  He told 
Adams that presently blacks felt “deserted” because he refused to meet with these acknowledged 
leaders, adding that the President’s seeing them would greatly boost the morale of all blacks.  He 
offered Adams his services and promised to work with Rabb if the President consented to see the 
black leaders.153  Rabb wrote to Adams the very next day and concurred with Morrow’s 
recommendation that the President grant them an appointment—after Congress adjourned or the 
bill was out of danger.  He added that he had personally convinced King (and Morrow) that 
waiting was the best strategy and that King had “agreed to be patient.”154  In exchange for his 
patience it is very likely that Rabb suggested to Nixon that he pitch King the invitation to testify 
to the Contracts Committee when they met the next week.      
 One of Rabb’s greatest traits was his loyalty to the President.  Rabb may or may not have 
agreed with Eisenhower’s views on maintaining balance and not privileging one group over 
another, but the fact is that Rabb enforced the President’s views.  In July, Reverend King 
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cleverly requested an appointment with President Eisenhower to off-set the meeting that Georgia 
Senator Richard Russell, Jr., had had with Eisenhower.  Rabb explained to King that Russell, in 
due course of executing his duties as a United States Senator, had a right to see the President and 
that it was not the same as seeing Southern governors or attorneys general.  Rabb then flatly told 
King that his presence would actually hinder the administration.155  In this Rabb may certainly 
have been right, as the legislation was still pending in Congress and was a matter of great debate.  
He was skillfully trying to time the meeting of black leaders with the President and not 
jeopardize the first piece of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. 
In late August, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and Eisenhower signed it in 
early September.  The way was open for a meeting at the White House, until external forces 
intervened to divert the meeting.  By late September 1957 the resistance to public school 
integration in Little Rock had reached crisis levels.  Although heavily involved in the 
management of the Little Rock crisis, Rabb—along with Morrow—continued to plan a meeting. 
Morrow wrote to Adams to let him know he would contact Roy Wilkins of the NAACP to 
arrange the meeting.  He expressed concern that there was no agenda, goal, or date set for the 
meeting.156  Morrow did not have Rabb’s authority to make decisions.  In response to Morrow’s 
questions, Rabb wrote to Adams that he had been meeting privately with Powell, Wilkins, and 
Jackie Robinson, the first black man to play in baseball’s Major Leagues in the modern era.  
Rabb determined that Eisenhower should meet with King, Powell, Wilkins, Robinson and 
Randolph.  Rabb even suggested to Adams that women be represented in the group.  Rabb set the 
meeting for October 15, but they all agreed that it might be more prudent to have as much 
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separation from the Little Rock crisis as possible.  The crisis had peaked in late September.  
Rabb proposed a quid-pro-quo agenda for the meeting, in which the black leaders would request 
the appointment of a Civil Rights Commission in return for their help coordinating what Rabb 
called “a calm and orderly approach to the integration problem.”157   Then the Soviet Union 
launched Sputnik into orbit right on the heels of Little Rock, causing panic in the West and 
consuming Eisenhower’s full attention and energy.  Suddenly, a fatigued and over-burdened 
Eisenhower fell victim to the rigors of the Presidency and had a stroke in late November.          
In winter 1958 Rabb continued to pressure Adams and other trusted members of the staff 
to hold the meeting.  In February, Rabb’s frustration became evident in his writing.  He no longer 
sounded as optimistic as previously.  In one response to the President’s appointment secretary on 
how to address a request from black leaders for a meeting, Rabb said that it “depends entirely on 
settling a policy question; do we give the appointment to the Negro leaders on which we are 
committed?”  Rabb told him that the Calendar Committee must decide one way or the other.158  
In March, exhausting every possible way to get the President to meet with black leaders, Rabb 
even suggested that Eisenhower might meet with Negro publishers—who had requested an 
appointment in May—in lieu of King and the others.  Far from trying to give the President an 
out, Rabb had evidently come to the realization that Eisenhower was very disinclined to meet 
with King, Randolph and others, and believed a meeting, was better than no meeting.159       
                                                 
157 Memorandum, Rabb to Adams, 27 September1957, OF-142-A Negro Matters-Colored Questions (5), Box 731, 
Official File, DDERAP, DDEL.  Rabb decided not to include Thurgood Marshall because that would over represent 
the NAACP.  Rabb recommended that Mrs. Irene McCoy Gaines, President of the National Association of Colored 
Women, a Republican, and strong supporter of Eisenhower attend the meeting.   
158 Memorandum, Rabb to Bob Gray, 22 February 1958, OF 142-A-Negro-Matters Colored Questions (6), Box 731, 
Official File, DDERAP, DDEL. 
159 Memorandum, Rabb to Tom Stephens, 25 March 1958, OF 142-A-Negro-Matters Colored Questions (6), Box 
731, Official File, DDERAP, DDEL.  Tom Stephens had replaced Bob Gray as Eisenhower’s appointment secretary.   
 68
Rabb’s records clearly demonstrate his support for a meeting between Eisenhower and 
some of the black leaders of the nation.  He carefully managed the whole process and tried to 
balance all the competing requirements.  Even Rabb’s influence had its limits, however, and he 
was not able to bring a meeting about during his tenure despite nearly two and half years of work 
on it.  All the while he was nudging and gently pushing the White House to make good on its 
commitment. 
Max Rabb resigned from the Eisenhower Administration in May 1958.  His successor in 
minority affairs, Rocco Siciliano, noticed how frequent the requests for a meeting had been as he 
went through Rabb’s files.  He asked Adams if he could finish what Rabb had started, and 
Adams told him to plan the meeting.  Siciliano called King, who readily agreed, and scheduled a 
“trial run” meeting on June 9.  Once there King assured those gathered that the most important 
thing about the meeting, was the meeting itself, a point that Rabb and Morrow had continually 
underscored.160  On June 23, Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., Lester Granger, A Philip 
Randolph, and Roy Wilkins met with President Eisenhower and Attorney General William 
Rogers.  The President and Attorney General listened to each man as each man spoke the words 
he had been waiting to deliver for over two years.  At the conclusion of the meeting—contrary to 
the fears of some on the White House staff—each man gave the press a glowing review of the 
President.              
Max Rabb and the Equality Committee 
Max Rabb was always concerned with public perceptions of the president’s performance 
of his duties, especially in the area of civil rights.  To better gauge this he directed a group that 
called itself the Equality Committee.  It had no formal authority or charter.  It was in actuality 
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just an ad hoc gathering of concerned Eisenhower men.  It is not clear whose idea it was to form 
the group.   Rabb said it was either Val Washington of the RNC or E. Frederic Morrow who 
suggested the idea.161   Sherman Adams—who was very sympathetic to civil rights—claimed 
that Rabb organized and led the group on his behalf, but he referred to it as the “kitchen 
cabinet.”162  The group was composed of the top black members of the Eisenhower 
administration and Republican Party in Washington.  Rabb was its only non-black member.  
They discussed those issues most important to the black community and how the administration 
could address them.  Rabb called their meetings “concerned check[s] on how things were going” 
and remembered them as generally very positive.  The group had no formal authority and thus 
could not recommend change but it allowed Rabb a chance to hear for himself the concerns of 
the black community.  Informally, it gave him direct access to a different and underrepresented 
point of view in the White House.  Although they lacked any formal authority, the advice they 
passed to Rabb was in turn forwarded to Adams and other members of the staff and party.  They 
also discussed current events and future civil rights initiatives.163 
Morrow recalled one meeting which Rabb called on December 19, 1955, as the 
administration was dealing with the aftermath of the killing of Emmett Till.  Morrow recalled 
that Rabb was under intense pressure from “factions within the administration” for insisting that 
the President mention the mob violence in Mississippi in his state of the union address.  The 
group unanimously agreed that the Republicans were missing an opportunity to take a moral 
stand on civil rights in this case.  No one in the party or White House had deplored the murder of 
Till, or the violence that followed, or the economic sanctions taken against blacks who protested 
                                                 
161 Rabb interview, OH-265, p. 29 DDEL. 
162 Adams interview, OH-162, p. 140, DDEL.   
163 Rabb interview, OH-265, pp. 29-31. 
 70
the whole affair.  Ironically, Morrow said they intended to have more meetings such as these but 
wanted to keep them and the matters they discussed secret so as not to be labeled as a “kitchen 
cabinet” or “negro spokesmen.”164   
Another member of the committee and member of the Executive Staff within HEW, 
Joseph Douglas, wrote Rabb a detailed memorandum.  He included an analysis suggesting why 
the party had failed to win over black voters despite a good and growing record in the civil rights 
field.  He wrote that “the administration moves quietly but solidly…this is commendable 
[however] some horn blowing is necessary.”  He further advised that the party would benefit 
from a stronger stance on civil rights from President Eisenhower, especially in the State of the 
Union address or some special address to the Congress.  He also suggested the use of more black 
speakers, and urged the administration to both initiate civil rights legislation and to rebut 
immediately any criticism of its record rather than remain silent.165  Rabb certainly forwarded 
these ideas, suggestions, and concerns to Adams, who had requested that Rabb and his 
committee explore this question.166  Though informal and without its own authority there is 
evidence that Rabb’s committee was able to influence the President.   Adams later wrote that 
President Eisenhower “took a bolder step than many of his close counselors deemed advisable 
when he asked Congress to establish a Civil Rights Commission.”  The commission would 
investigate “unwarranted economic pressure” being placed on blacks and charges that blacks 
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were being deprived of their right to vote.167  These were some of the very suggestions that 
Douglas had made to Rabb and though they reflected a very common sentiment in the black 
community, it was Rabb who gave them greater credibility. 
Max Rabb the First Cabinet Secretary 
Max Rabb’s primary duty in the White House after October 1953 was serving as the 
Secretary to the Cabinet.  The creation of the Cabinet Secretariat was a direct result of 
Eisenhower’s perception that the previous two presidents had mismanaged their Cabinets.  
Eisenhower had attended cabinet meetings during Truman’s presidency and was thoroughly 
unimpressed.  He believed those meeting were uncoordinated, haphazard and fostered an 
organizational climate that made cohesion impossible.  He further believed that the embarrassing 
public rivalries that erupted between cabinet members under Truman were the natural result of 
this poorly managed organization.168  Eisenhower laid out his plan in a post-election and pre-
inaugural meeting at which were gathered many future members of the Cabinet and White House 
staff.  He told those assembled that he was going to have all the major questions of domestic 
policy laid in front of him and did not want anyone delivering an ex parte presentation to him.169   
Eisenhower wanted his cabinet members to come prepared to deliver thoughtful and 
honest insight and dispense timely advice to him in order to help him make administration 
policy.  This required not only active but systematic management.  In order to handle these 
requirements he created the Cabinet Secretariat and named Rabb its first secretary.  Eisenhower 
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was very impressed with the amount of work that Rabb could manage and the diversity of topics 
that he deftly handled.170 
It was left entirely to Rabb to develop this new office.171  Rabb defined its process and 
established and implemented new forms of communication to support the President.  Rabb 
managed the affairs of the Cabinet in three phases that were largely dictated by timing and the 
President’s desires.  In order, these phases were: development of the agenda, pre-meeting 
coordination, and post-meeting follow-up.  The actual Cabinet meetings were not themselves 
labor-intensive and were guided largely by the President himself.  These were not neatly 
contained phases that ended before the next meeting cycle began.  Many times issues from 
meetings took weeks and months to resolve or weeks and months to develop for future meetings.              
The most important duty of the secretary was to suggest and develop topics for the 
agenda.  Max Rabb, and his assistant Bradley Patterson, suggested potential topics and broached 
them with Sherman Adams.  If he approved them then the President would have the final 
word.172  Making these suggestions required that Rabb keep well abreast of domestic politics and 
foreign affairs.  Researching possible agenda topics for the Cabinet required Rabb to become 
familiar with nearly every domestic policy issue and many foreign policy issues so that the 
President and the Cabinet could stay ahead of them.   
The office the Secretary of the Cabinet, if not the actual secretary, had great potential to 
shape the collective thinking and actions of the departments.  Patterson recalled that many times 
it took forceful persuasion to get departments to discuss certain topics as they “were indisposed 
to hasten to suggest items for discussion.”  It was left to Rabb “to dig, wheedle, persuade and 
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finesse cabinet members to bring to the common table what were clearly common matters, but 
which [the departments] would much prefer to bring privately to the Oval Office.”  According to 
Patterson, not once in Rabb’s tenure as Cabinet Secretary did Eisenhower ever complain that an 
item proposed for discussion was one that he did not want to discuss at a meeting.173  Rabb also 
said that the advantages of a secretariat included avoiding repetition and exposing topics for 
wider discussion that might otherwise have been avoided for various reasons by the 
departments.174   
Once agendas were approved Rabb and his staff began pre-meeting coordination.  They 
had to ensure that any work associated with developing any of the topics was assigned to the 
appropriate department or agency.   As the secretary, Rabb tasked the Cabinet departments to 
come prepared to deliver talking points and brief position papers on topics of presidential 
interest.  Even if reticent, they knew he was fully backed by the President and therefore 
complied.175  Rabb was however a fair man, and if a department needed more time to develop a 
position he was able to help them, unless the President really wanted to hear from them.  Once 
Rabb’s office received these papers, they were distributed along with the agenda well in advance 
of the usual Friday morning meetings.  This way the Cabinet members arrived forewarned and 
ready to deliver considered commentary and have the productive and substantive discussions that 
Eisenhower wanted.176           
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 At the behest of Ezra Taft Benson, Secretary of Agriculture, it became the convention to 
open each meeting with a silent prayer.177  Once the meetings began, Rabb’s staff kept a written 
record complete with attendance rosters and notes capturing the general arc of a conversation or 
thread.178  Many times Eisenhower had already made up his mind about certain topics and used 
the time to educate his secretaries at these meetings.  Benson said that the President did not 
dominate the discussions but led them.  And in those rare moments when participants were not 
forthcoming Eisenhower would ask his Cabinet Secretaries direct questions to incite 
discussion.179  The focus of many meetings was to solidify the administration team rather than to 
seek alternatives, but Eisenhower was open to persuasion.180  Once a presentation was 
concluded, Eisenhower might tell everyone present that they were to adopt those points of view 
and speak about them and sell them as their own, even if they had no apparent vested interest in 
the topic or program.181  Often, cabinet members appreciated being privy to high-level 
information outside of their departmental domains, which fostered a sense of cohesion among the 
cabinet members, giving them further incentive to support the administration’s positions.182  
Arthur Larson wrote, “thus we not only were kept systematically briefed on events of the day, 
but over a period of time came to know in some depth the plans and problems of our colleagues’ 
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departments.”183  Larson was describing in part one of Eisenhower’s expressed intentions—that 
his Cabinet members view themselves as general statesmen and not just defenders of their 
departments.184  Rabb’s organizational efforts, in directing the thoughts of the members, were 
essential to the President’s goals of teaching and unifying his Cabinet.    
The final phase began when the Cabinet meeting ended.  The secretariat implemented any 
of the President’s decisions and generally tracked the requirements generated by Cabinet 
meetings.185  To ensure accountability Rabb or someone else in the secretariat would meet with 
the sub-cabinet level action officers of each department—a so called “junior cabinet.”  Many of 
these men were the assistant or deputy secretaries.  At these meetings Rabb or his staff members 
handed out any requirements generated by the meeting so that each representative could take 
back their tasks and begin working on them.186  The final management technique Rabb employed 
to ensure closure was a “scorecard” which tracked the number of outstanding or unresolved 
issues each department or agency had and their current status.  No Cabinet member wanted to be 
singled out in front of the President or peers in this way, thus giving each greater impetus to 
complete their assigned tasks.187   
President Eisenhower not only demanded the creation of this structure to manage the 
affairs of the Cabinet.  He also elevated other positions to Cabinet level rank and status.  Those 
positions were the Ambassador to the United Nations, Director of Defense Mobilization, Budget 
Director, Director of Mutual Security, and one Presidential Special Assistant for each of the 
following: the White House Staff, Cold War psychological planning, and national security 
affairs.  Eisenhower believed these positions to be critical in his government but their lack of 
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rank in previous administrations diminished the importance of their work and allowed the 
departments to relate to them on merely a clerical level.188  Elevating these positions and 
functions was another indication of Eisenhower’s integrated systemic approach to organization 
and problem solving.  It fell on Rabb and his office to integrate them into the Cabinet 
structure.189   
Ultimate proof of the efficiency of this system was revealed in the wake of President 
Eisenhower’s heart attack.190  When Eisenhower fell ill in Denver, in September 1955, Vice-
President Nixon, Sherman Adams, and others decided to hold a Cabinet meeting within a week 
of the heart attack—without an advance agenda—if just to prove to the world that the business of 
government would go on and ensure continuity in White House Staff and Cabinet operations.191  
Nixon told every member of the Cabinet and staff that the greatest tribute they could pay to the 
President was to continue to serve as they had before his illness.   
He also urged them to make public comments about President Eisenhower’s skill in 
having formed an effective administrative machine.  All these are indirect compliments to Max 
Rabb, whose primary job was the organization of the Cabinet and all its affairs.    Sherman 
Adams worked out of Denver during the President’s convalescence, while the Vice-President 
and the staff remained in the White House.  During this time Rabb sent Eisenhower summaries 
of the Cabinet proceedings, which boosted his morale and gave him a great sense of continuity 
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and participation.192  Much of the credit must go to Rabb not only for keeping Eisenhower 
informed but for what must have been an increased work load in the absence of his immediate 
boss.  Sherman Adams remained on the phone constantly with the White House making every 
manner of arrangement to ensure that there was no break in the performance of the 
administration.      
 Everything about this position was new and Rabb had only theoretical models and staff 
studies to guide him in the management of cabinet affairs.  Despite this, his performance was a 
brilliant and simultaneous act of leadership and creation.  The importance of these 
organizations—official or unofficial—was that they were the only mechanisms of change that 
Rabb had access to within the Eisenhower White House.  There were few pathways to exercise 
power in the early period of the administration, and virtually none for civil rights.  As the 
Eisenhower Administration matured so too developed the opportunities to exercise authority and 
power—and this Max Rabb did.     
When asked, years after his service in the Eisenhower Administration, if he had ever used 
his ability to set the agenda to promote civil rights he emphatically answered, no.193  It is true 
that civil rights as an agenda item only appeared seven times during Rabb’s tenure as 
secretary.194  However, Rabb could and did use his influence in other ways and there is evidence 
that he did.  Rabb was never officially designated as the race relations, civil rights or minority 
advisor.195  That point is moot because Rabb did the work anyway.  Rabb acted in different 
capacities as a member of the staff.  Part of his staff identity was as a minority rights advisor, and 
this was inseparable from his other roles.  What developed was a pattern of Max Rabb 
                                                 
192 Donovan, 374-382. 
193 Rabb interview, OH-479, p. 23. 
194 Finding Aid, A Guide To Civil Rights Studies At the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, DDEL.  The guide has no 
page numbers. 
195 Rabb interview, OH-265, p. 2. 
 78
influencing everyone in the White House from the President on down, perhaps not overtly in a 
Cabinet meeting but in his capacity as the Assistant to Sherman Adams or as Assistant Counsel 
to the President.     
There is evidence that Rabb openly tried to influence the Eisenhower Administration 
through the agenda on at least one occasion.  Just prior to the announcement of the unanimous 
Supreme Court decision in the Brown case in April 1954, Rabb tried to establish a committee 
that would proactively respond to the decision.  He clearly anticipated that the decision would 
trigger complex problems and that various groups from Southern governors to civil rights groups 
would look to the White House for guidance.  It is very likely that he or Bradley Patterson 
proposed the creation of the committee in a tentative agenda used at a planning meeting to set the 
Cabinet agenda.  The item on the agenda read as follows: 
President Eisenhower and his Administration should extend a sympathetic 
understanding of the problem which will be created in the Southern states and, more 
importantly, have ready about the time of such decision a constructive program that will 
assist them in rebuilding their public school systems.  It is necessary to take some steps to 
avoid the appearance of an after-thought.  The way this can be done is the establishment 
of a subcommittee to be prepared to go into action immediately to handle this matter.  It 
is suggested that…Budget, HEW, Justice, Defense and the White House (Rabb) be 
appointed to it.196 
 
The same suggestion also appeared in another tentative agenda prepared for the same 
planning meeting.  The essence of the suggestion remained intact but lacked the urgent 
justification set forth in the other tentative agenda.  It is shorter and more consistent with 
Eisenhower’s expressed preferences on the limits of federal involvement, and therefore may 
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have been a revised edition of the other draft.  This tentative agenda suggested that, “when the 
Supreme Court hands down its decision, the Administration will look good if it is immediately 
announced that it is prepared to meet the federal aspects of this problem.”  It also recommended 
the creation of a subcommittee but this suggested committee omitted two of the five agencies—
that had been recommended in the other agenda.  This tentative agenda did not recommend the 
inclusion of the Bureau of the Budget or of the White House—this left Rabb out of the group.197     
  Since both documents are labeled “tentative agenda” and have the same date it is not 
clear which was discussed at the planning meeting.  Nor is it clear who wrote the proposals, or 
which was authored first.  Since the Cabinet Secretariat convened the planning meetings it is 
almost impossible that Rabb or Patterson (with Rabb’s approval) did not author one or both 
agendas.  It is most likely that Rabb changed the longer first entry in order to make it more 
agreeable to the other members of the planning committee and ultimately to the President 
himself.  The phrasing of the second agenda directly reflected Eisenhower’s campaign promises, 
promises with which Rabb was very familiar.  Furthermore, Rabb, who by this time had 
submitted many agendas, presided over many meetings, and had already been heavily involved 
in civil rights, knew the mind of Eisenhower and how to work within his limits.  Finally, Rabb so 
fully subscribed to Eisenhower’s “quiet” method that he may have stricken his own name from 
the proposed subcommittee but still intended to attend as an ex officio, in order to attract less 
attention to the subcommittee.198  Despite Rabb’s intentions this committee was never created. 
These two documents also mention another agenda topic and reflect, from the second to 
the first, the same changes as the previously mentioned proposed committee.  Both mentioned 
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that Rabb was on, yet, another committee with other White House staff members called the 
Organization for Inspection and Investigation.  Both agendas mentioned that the organization 
had met several times to study a program that would “assure high standards of ethical conduct” 
in the Executive branch.  The document also mentioned the occurrence of unnamed “disclosures” 
within one of the Executive branch agencies that highlighted the need for this organization to 
take action.  Presumably the committee was to prevent the reoccurrence of these infractions and 
then make a presentation to the whole Cabinet.199   
Both agendas indicate Rabb’s willingness to serve the administration in different 
capacities and the increasing amount of responsibility he had.  Even the in-house committees and 
groups not directly related to civil rights were important in his work in civil rights and race 
relations.  Rabb’s service in these organizations reinforced his credibility and authority, 
increased his visibility in the White House, and was a sign of the trust and confidence that more 
important actors like Sherman Adams and the President had in Rabb.  
In the strictest sense, Max Rabb the Cabinet Secretary did not advance civil rights, but 
Max Rabb the unofficial minority rights advisor did.200  Because he was never appointed to this 
position in writing or given the title or responsibility in any formal way, it was left up to him to 
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devise ways to implement change.  Creating and serving on committees, groups and 
subcommittees was the best way to help initiate change.  
The case of Max Rabb and the transformation of the Fair Employment Board is another 
example of Rabb using an organization to advance the cause of civil rights.  The remade Fair 
Employment Board—like the Cabinet Secretariat—along with the board’s roles, responsibilities, 
and procedures were all defined by Rabb.  In was another simultaneous act of organizational 
leadership and creation which prefigured Rabb’s role as the Cabinet Secretary and many of his 
later accomplishments.  It is also another reason why Eisenhower believed Rabb capable enough 
to be the Cabinet Secretary.  Despite Eisenhower’s aversion for heavy-handed committees he 
was not afraid to use his authority to enforce federal laws.  Nor was he averse to creating 
committees that functioned within his sense of the proper role and limits of Presidential power 
and authority.  Rabb carefully stayed within the President’s limits and was able to rescue the Fair 
Employment Board by remaking it to mirror Eisenhower’s political and personal preferences.  
Max Rabb Remakes the Fair Employment Board 
When Eisenhower assumed office he inherited President Truman’s Fair Employment 
Board.  The board lacked independent enforcement powers.  However it possessed the authority 
to bypass agency chiefs and take complaints directly to the President when the agencies were 
unwilling to carry out its recommendations.201  Eisenhower was very uncomfortable with this 
arrangement, which he believed to be another example of Truman’s coercive use of authority to 
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drive change.  He was not comfortable with its presence in his administration because of its 
potential to embarrass the administration and bring problems right to his desk.202   
President Eisenhower privately expressed doubts about the effectiveness of making 
change in this manner after a visit from Governor James Byrnes of South Carolina, a former 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and Secretary of State.  Eisenhower considered Byrnes a 
“great friend…in whose company [he] always [found] a great deal for enjoyment.”   That day in 
July 1953, he came to brief Eisenhower on Southern sentiments regarding the pending Brown 
decision which threatened to end segregation not just in schools but in all society.  Eisenhower’s 
words reveal the complexity of civil rights issues and his attitude about government involvement 
in the field.  
Eisenhower wrote in his diary that he believed Byrnes knew of his belief “that 
improvement in race relations [was] one of those things that [would] be healthy and sound only 
if it start[ed] locally.”  He expressed more private doubts about using laws to force change.  He 
wrote, “I do not believe that prejudices…will succumb to compulsion.  Consequently, I believe 
that federal law imposed upon our states in such a way as to bring about a conflict of the police 
powers of the states and of the nation, (sic) would set back the cause of progress in race relations 
for a long, long time.”203 
The Fair Employment Board—operating under its original charter—immediately justified 
the fears of President Eisenhower by investigating a complaint against the Treasury Department.  
The complaint initiated by the NAACP alleged that the Bureau of Engraving and Printing—a 
subordinate agency of the Treasury—had fired several black apprentices in an “economy 
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move.”204  It was obvious that the way this body operated was inconsistent with Eisenhower’s 
preferred methods—and Rabb knew it.  It could not continue to exist in its present form.  It had 
to be dissolved or changed.  Rabb realized the possibility that President Eisenhower might 
abolish it and took action to prevent that.205  Rabb expressed his opinion in writing to Sherman 
Adams.  The memorandum lacked the kind of succinct title usually associated with White House 
Staff work, but a brief title could not have explained Rabb’s purpose any better.  The subject was 
“A Brief Summary of Some Reasons Why It Is Important to Establish a President’s Committee 
on Government Employment Policy.”   
Rabb did not attack the board or the reasons for its existence.  Instead he attacked the 
rules under which it operated.  This approach allowed Rabb to make a case later for changing the 
rules rather than dissolving the board.  He wrote that Truman’s order contained “provisions that 
have been and will continue to be embarrassing to the Administration.”  He explained that 
Truman’s board could overrule a Cabinet member and appeal right to the President—a procedure 
that was inconsistent with Eisenhower’s preferences.  Rabb reported to Adams that they needed 
to create a new committee because abolishing Truman’s board, without creating a new one, 
would result in “very severe and justified public criticism.”  Rabb then reminded Adams of the 
pending complaint against the Treasury Department and admitted that he and others “kept the 
report from being published” and that preventing its publication much longer was 
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“questionable.”  He advised Adams that this situation could be solved by terminating the old 
board and chartering a new but similar board with different powers.   
In the committee that Rabb proposed, the President would cease to be the appeal 
authority.  Rabb would have each Cabinet Secretary or agency chief make the final decision in 
each case.  Truman’s board was able to take its recommendations to the President if an agency 
did not favorably act on its recommendation.  The new committee—like Truman’s—would 
remain an advisory body, but its only contact with the President would be the annual reports it 
made to him.  Rabb concluded by informing Adams that he had staffed the proposal among the 
Civil Service Commission, the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department and that it 
met with their approval.206 
The creation of the new committee was another example of Max Rabb’s leadership 
within the Eisenhower Administration.  His work in this process, as with the development of the 
Cabinet Secretariat, was another example of creative leadership and of brilliant orchestration.  
Although creating the committee depended heavily on the involvement of several other critical 
staff members, it was Rabb who coordinated all the separate facets to ensure the plan’s final 
fruition.  Max Rabb had been working on this issue since he met with Congressman Powell in 
summer 1953.  After Rabb, the most important other administration official in the process was 
Philip Young of the Civil Service Commission.  Rabb had commenced coordination with Young 
on the issue as early as summer 1953.  In a memorandum to Sherman Adams written in June of 
that year, Rabb informed Adams that he had “already discussed the matter several times with 
Philip Young.”207  
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Young, for his part, had the Civil Service Commission conduct a comparison between 
Truman’s board and the new proposed Eisenhower committee.208  Given that Rabb was 
Eisenhower’s chosen instrument for civil rights, and Rabb’s statement to Adams, it would have 
been inconceivable for Rabb not to have been consulted on the new committee.  The differences 
between them directly reflected Eisenhower’s expressed preferences, especially his desire to use 
persuasion over force.  Young incorporated all of Rabb’s recommendations.  The most 
significant difference in Young’s proposal was to remove the President as the appeal authority.  
If the chief of an agency refused to act on the recommendation of the proposed committee, it 
could not appeal to the President—as it could under Truman.  Both Truman’s board and 
Eisenhower’s proposed committee were primarily advisory in their capacity.  However, in 
Eisenhower’s committee a case was closed once an agency chief accepted or refused the 
recommendation of the committee, there simply was no appeal or review authority.  Young’s 
plan also called for a smaller body, five members instead of the seven on Truman’s board.209   
Once Rabb was confident that Young was making the necessary changes to the new 
committee he began choosing its members.  Here he required the help of Charles F. Willis, Jr., 
another of Sherman Adams’ assistants, who worked on personnel issues for the White House 
staff.210  Rabb made most of the recommendations to serve on the new committee and he 
believed they were a diverse group of talented people.  Rabb passed the names of the proposed 
members to Willis in a memorandum and urged a speedy processing of this staff action.  He told 
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Willis that the “sooner the Committee was announced, the better off we will be.”  Rabb’s 
conscience was troubled because, as he wrote to Willis, he (Rabb) was still “sitting on the 
present Committee’s report…and it was dangerous to leave such a recommendation in 
abeyance.”  Rabb felt that once the new committee was announced the White House would not 
have to take action on the recommendations of the previous report.211  This would spare the 
President from any more embarrassment. 
As Willis began processing the names through the usual battery of checks—security, 
background and political affiliations—Rabb continued to pour time and energy into creating the 
new committee.  Rabb contacted every member of the group to ensure that they would serve on 
the committee if asked by the President.  Once the checks were complete, Willis forwarded to 
Adams the whole staff action including a draft of the Presidential Executive Order (EO) creating 
the new committee.  In his memorandum, Willis told Adams that Rabb had advised him “that he 
(Rabb) spoke personally with the President on this, and that the President ha[d] given his OK on 
the EO and the slate.” 212 As Willis worked on the personnel issues, Rabb had the draft of the 
Executive Order and was “bringing it up to date.”  Rabb, to avoid any more delays, wanted the 
order establishing the committee signed the same day that its members were appointed.213  Willis 
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sent Adams the final staff action in January 1955.  Three of its seven enclosures had been written 
by Rabb.  One was the memorandum he sent to Adams explaining the need to for the new 
committee; the second was a letter indicating that everyone agreed to serve; and the third was the 
Executive Order he had helped to write.214     
  James Hagerty, the President’s Press Secretary, was the final ingredient in the 
mix.  Rabb requested that they take advantage of the Congressional recess—most likely to 
minimize confrontation—to issue a press release.  Rabb wanted the release to “simultaneously 
make public (1) the new Executive Order and (2) the new membership of the committee.”  Rabb 
explained to Hagerty that the dual step was required to clear out the present members, “who 
operate under a dangerous Executive Order.”  It permitted them “to bring messy minor problems 
to the President as a court of final resort.”215  It appeared that Rabb believed he needed to 
impress upon Hagerty how uncomfortable the situation was for the President. 
 The President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy was created on 
January 18, 1955, when President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10590.  The new 
committee catered to President Eisenhower’s vision of limited government and restraint in the 
exercise of Executive authority.  Its focus was to forestall complaints by educating federal 
agencies and persuading them to adopt fair employment practices rather than forcing change—
which it could not do.  The committee also listened to complaints but had no authority to force 
any agency to address a grievance.  Within five months the committee wrote and distributed its 
                                                 
214 Memorandum, Willis to Adams, 14 January 1955, 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment 
Policy (1), Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL. 
215 Memorandum, Rabb to Hagerty, undated, 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy (1), 
Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL.  Attached to this memorandum, Rabb also sent a copy of the EO, the 
memo he had written to Adams justifying the need to change the present board, and the memorandum he had written 
to Willis with the proposed members.  Found in the same place as the given citation.  
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procedures for investigating complaints.216  They immediately began considering cases and by 
the end of 1955 had convened 21 times.217  When the committee submitted its first annual report 
to the President it came through Rabb.  He wrote to the President informing him that the 
committee had “moved cautiously in this first year, but in such a way as to gain the respect and 
confidence of the agencies and departments with which it works.”  Rabb asked the President to 
give them “encouragement” through his “acknowledgment of their report.”218       
 Max Rabb must have had some sense that this committee was weak.  Despite this 
it was one of the few organizations which was dedicated to civil rights and that could be used for 
some positive good.  Rabb knew that Eisenhower preferred voluntary change through persuasive 
means, which explains why Rabb wrote so many letters to the Cabinet Departments and their 
sub-agencies on behalf of this committee.  He expressed his delight at their use of uncompelled 
educational policies.219  The committee proposed to Rabb, for his guidance, that a full-time 
compliance officer hired in each agency to handle complaints and implement the policy of 
agency—per its own chief.220  Rabb’s initial inclination was to put it off until after the election in 
November, and he told Abbell that in a memorandum.  However, he thought about it and then 
                                                 
216 Memorandum, Maxwell Abbell, Chairman of the President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy, to 
Heads of Department and Independent Establishments, 3 June 1955, 103-U President’s Committee on Government 
Employment Policy (2) [1], Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL.   
217 Agenda for 20th and 21st meeting of the President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy, 15 and 16 
December 1955, 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy (2) [1], Box 473, Official File, 
Central File, DDEL. 
218 Memorandum, Rabb to Eisenhower, 6 June 1956, 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment 
Policy (2) [2], Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL.   
219 As an example, Rabb wrote memos to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, VA, and Civil Service 
Commission, congratulating them on implementing voluntary fair employment practices.  He informed each 
secretary that he was going to bring the progress of each to the attention of the President.  They may have 
considered this a hefty recommendation as, by this time, some of these same men had witnessed the rise of Robert 
Anderson, in fact, Charles Thomas, the Undersecretary of the Navy under Anderson whose initial report said 
desegregation in the shipyards was possible, was at this time the Secretary of the Navy.  Letters, Rabb to Sec. Army, 
et al, various dates, 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy (2) [2], Box 473, Official 
File, Central File, DDEL. 
220 Letter, Abbell to Rabb, 24 May 1956, 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy (2) [2], 
Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL.  The committee was frustrated that in each agency it someone’s extra 
duty—more often perceived as an extra burden—to field complaints and implement policy. 
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recommended to other staff members that it might be worth considering “because of the impact it 
would have on those who are interested in combating discrimination and as to the sincerity of the 
government in this field.”221  Here again Rabb demonstrated his genuine willingness to improve 
the situation for minority members of society.  The record does not indicate if this 
recommendation was ever acted on, but it was likely not even considered beyond those that Rabb 
asked to consider it.     
 When Maxwell Abbell resigned, due to poor health, Rabb recommended that 
Archibald Carey succeed him.222  There was value in having a black man serve as the chairman 
of a Presidential Committee but Rabb also believed him to be “a moderate, understanding 
member of the Administration.”  This meant that Carey would take his direction from Rabb, who 
would ensure that the committee work for change within Eisenhower’s comfort range.  He also 
recommended as Carey’s replacement, Branch Rickey, who Rabb believed would “direct 
favorable attention to the committee.”223  As a final means of strengthening the committee, he 
recommended that one of the alternate memberships be converted into a permanent membership 
in the wake of Philip Marfuggi’s resignation.  Rabb said these changes “would strengthen the 
committee from the Administration’s point of view” and bring a “greater degree of acceptance of 
                                                 
221 Letter, Rabb to Abbell, 31 May 1956; Memorandum Rabb to Philip Young, Fred Morrow, Bob Gray, 31 May 
1956, both in 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy (2) [2], Box 473, Official File, 
Central File, DDEL.   
222 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archibald_Carey,_Jr.  Archibald Carey was a well known and respected black 
leader from Chicago.  He represented Chicago’s Third Ward as an alderman from 1947 through 1955.  He was a 
graduate of John Marshall Law School in Chicago.  From 1953 to 1956 he was an alternate delegate from the United 
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bench at the age of 70 in 1978.  He was widely known in Chicago for his contributions to civic improvement.   
223 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Branch_Rickey.  Although no other information was found in Rabb’s papers 
about Branch Rickey, it makes sense that it is the same Branch Rickey who helped Jackie Robinson brake the color 
barrier in Major League Baseball.  That Branch Rickey signed Robinson to play for the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947 
and later signed superstar Roberto Clemente, one of the first Latin Americans in the Major Leagues.  This fact fits 
well with Rabb’s statement that Rickey would “direct favorable attention to the committee and represents an 
effective spokesman in this field.”  Who better to serve on a fair employment committee than a man who helped 
integrate an entire profession. 
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this group by the public.”224  After Adams ordered Rabb to confer with the Vice-President on 
these changes—and Nixon readily agreed—Rabb forwarded his recommendations to the 
President, who approved them and made Carey the new chairman.225  Overwhelmed, Carey 
expressed his gratitude to the President.  He also told Eisenhower that Rabb had “made 
immeasurable contributions to the committee by many hours of labor and a great capacity for 
dealing with problems in human relations.”226  This was only official verification of what 
Eisenhower already knew, as he had never once addressed the board in person nor sent them any 
other communications except for the annual letter thanking them for their report.  Rabb had been 
directing the committee since he first created it.  Rabb guided it and met with it on occasion and 
always remained in constant communication with them.      
 Rabb’s final intercession on behalf of the committee came just months before his 
own resignation.  He tried to schedule an appointment for the board to meet with the President.  
His words, as with trying to make an appointment for the prominent black leaders, indicate a 
level of frustration.  He wrote: 
Through the years I have kept this and my other Presidential-level committees 
from visiting with the President.  My problem here is that this policy has not been 
followed with reference to other groups.  While I am intent on keeping these committees 
far from the President, I believe…that a visit…might be given favorable consideration.  
This committee had been in existence almost since the President first took office and it 
has never had any direct word or visit from him in that time.  They have quietly and 
effectively carried out their work.  If it could be arranged, the presentation of their 
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225 Memorandum, Adams to Rabb, 13 March 1957; Memorandum (for record), Rabb, 19 April 1957; Letter, Bob 
Gray to Archibald Carey, 15 August 1957, all in 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy 
(4), Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL. 
226 Letter, Carey to Eisenhower, 6 August 1957, 103-U President’s Committee on Government Employment Policy 
(4), Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL 
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Annual Report which would not take more than five minutes would have a very helpful 
effect.227 
 
 There is no indication that the President ever met with this committee when Rabb 
left the administration in May 1958.  It is likely that he did not given the troubles that 
Eisenhower had gone through with Little Rock, Sputnik, and his own stroke.  Whatever 
weaknesses the committee had were not accidental flaws but characteristics designed by Rabb.  
He knew that the nation and the federal government needed a board like this, no matter how 
weak it was.  Any board was better than no board at all.  Some historians have criticized this 
committee as being only of symbolic value, but, if analyzed from Rabb’s point of view its 
existence was a triumph in and of itself.  This is why Rabb spent those long hours, to which 
Carey had referred, trying to strengthen the board, all the while working within Eisenhower’s 
conception of Executive authority. 
Conclusion 
       All of Max Rabb’s work within the organizations of the Executive Branch clearly 
indicated his desire to advance civil rights.  The common component of all of his actions within 
these organizations, whether he created them or just served in them, was that once a part of them, 
he tried to expand his role in them.  As he gained influence, through his great job performance 
and multitude of roles, he began gradually to push the Eisenhower Administration forward on 
civil rights.  He also worked to expand the narrow conceptions he believed that many other staff 
members had about the relationship between a government and its people.  He never frontally 
assaulted any idea or person in the Eisenhower Administration.  Instead, Rabb went about his 
                                                 
227 Memorandum, Rabb to Mary Burns, 28 January 1957, 103-U President’s Committee on Government 
Employment Policy (4), Box 473, Official File, Central File, DDEL. 
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duties the “Eisenhower way,” quietly and without fanfare or attention.  All the while he was 
making progress in civil rights, staying safely within Eisenhower’s comfort zone but seeking to 
expand it.        
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 CHAPTER 3 - 
                                                
American Race Relations on the World Stage 
 Introduction 
Long before President Eisenhower assumed office in January 1953, race had become an 
undeniable element in international relations.  In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist—
and later Nobel recipient—published his highly acclaimed work, An American Dilemma.228  To 
Myrdal, the democratic values of the “American Creed” were not just one among several 
competing public belief systems, but rather, the essence of the national ethos.  The creed was a 
moral gauge to measure public and private actions.  In short, the dilemma was the utter failure of 
whites to live up to professed national values.229  This failure had implications beyond the 
borders of the Unites States.  To the dark-skinned people of the world the treatment of black 
Americans was a telling glimpse of the treatment they might in turn receive from the United 
States.  Whether true or not, those perceptions greatly damaged the reputation of the United 
States, at a time when the future of the world was very uncertain and the U.S. counted on its 
democratic prestige to wage the Cold War.       
The most significant reason for the growing importance of race in world politics in the 
post-World War II era was the emergence of many new states in Africa and Asia.  These new 
nations were former colonies or clients of European states.  Although everything that Max Rabb 
did had value for its own sake, his work in race relations took on special significance given that 
American race relations had become a matter of international concern.  And much of the world 
 
228 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1944). 
229 Burk, 11. 
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was more race-conscious than ever before.  America’s history of racism and its practice of 
segregation were so potent that these conditions seriously threatened America’s credibility and 
prestige in the early part of the Cold War.  In an indirect way, Max Rabb’s work in domestic race 
relations and civil rights was important in countering Soviet propaganda aimed at discrediting 
the United States and discouraging emerging third world nations from allying themselves with 
the U.S.  However, some of the issues on which Max Rabb worked involved the confluence of 
race relations and human rights on the one hand with U.S. domestic and foreign policy on the 
other.  It was increasingly clear to Rabb, and many others, that race relations in the United States 
were no longer confined to the domestic sphere.  Furthermore, Eisenhower linked human rights 
to race relations and civil rights.  Not surprisingly, then, Rabb was assigned to work on human 
rights issues and other race-related issues that directly and indirectly affected America’s 
international prestige.   
After World War II, race relations in the U.S. were no longer confined to the domestic 
sphere and issues of race increasingly permeated American foreign policy. As the United States 
emerged from the war as the presumptive leader of the free world, race relations became a matter 
of international concern.  In order to be a beacon of democracy during the Cold War and provide 
an alternate model of development to those nations emerging from colonialism the United States 
could no longer discriminate against minorities within its own borders.230  Nor could the United 
States afford to dismiss race as a factor of supreme importance when dealing with old and new 
states in the world.  And Eisenhower was aware of these possibilities.  Four case studies in 
particular show the way in which race became a factor of greater consideration in situations 
involving U.S. foreign and domestic policy and what that meant for the United States in the Cold 
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War.  Max Rabb’s role and the level of involvement in each case vary and though they are not 
directly linked, they are related in a grander sense.  In each, there is an element of race which 
necessitated Rabb’s involvement.  These examples help to prove that Rabb was an 
underappreciated member of the Eisenhower White House whose reach went far beyond the 
walls of the White House and the shores of the United States.          
Max Rabb Beats the Immigration Quota  
One of the facets of President Eisenhower’s legislative agenda was to repeal the 
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which became law in the last year of the Truman 
Administration.231 Harry Truman took a courageous stand against both the bill and many 
members of his party when he vetoed it, only to have the Democrat-controlled Congress override 
his veto and pass the legislation.  Defeating this act or renegotiating it were a part of President 
Eisenhower’s broadly conceived social plan, which correlated civil and social rights to human 
rights.  Eisenhower even made immigration reform a campaign issue.  In September 1953, 
during the campaign, Eisenhower poignantly spoke out against the McCarran bill.  He said: 
Most importantly, we must strike from our own statute books any legislation 
concerning immigration that implies the blasphemy against democracy that only certain 
groups of Europeans are welcome on American shores.232 
  
President Eisenhower had many ideas in mind when he announced in his first State of the 
Union Address that “civil rights [were] inevitably involved in Federal legislation…[in] the 
sphere of immigration.”  The President called for Congress to fairly reassess the number of 
immigrants that the nation could absorb.  He further said: 
                                                 
231 This act was also known as the Immigration and Neutrality Act of 1952, Eisenhower, 216. 
232 Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower The President (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), 37. 
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Existing legislation contained injustices.  It does, in fact discriminate.  I am 
therefore requesting the Congress to review this legislation and to enact a statue that will 
at one and the same time guard our legitimate national interests and be faithful to our 
basic ideas of freedom and fairness to all.233 
    
At least two foreign leaders made direct appeals to President Eisenhower to absorb more 
immigrants.  Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi contacted President Eisenhower and told 
him that the situation in Italy was desperate.  De Gasperi relayed to Eisenhower that 
unemployment rates were high (and rising) and that these conditions fostered the perfect 
environment for communists to exert pressure and influence.  In addition, Queen Juliana of the 
Netherlands petitioned Eisenhower to allow a greater influx of Dutch and Indonesians into the 
United States.  Her state—like Italy—was still suffering from the destructive effects of the 
war.234  Both leaders feared that their nations were too weak to stave off communist agitation 
and feared internal economic collapse.    
When he assumed office, President Eisenhower assigned Max Rabb the duty of 
overturning this law.  Rabb said: “while this [was] not civil rights, it [was] the field of human 
rights, so closely akin to it, and it demonstrate[d] how I entered this area.”  Rabb’s words seem 
to confirm Eisenhower’s systemic grouping of things, and it appeared that Rabb also agreed with 
the correlation.  The White House legislative group, who normally would have drawn the task 
and who jealously guarded their assigned area of responsibility, readily passed it to Rabb.  Rabb 
recalled that “there was not the slightest reluctance whatsoever in passing this red hot potato of 
civil and human rights over to [him].”235   
                                                 
233 State of the Union Speech, President Eisenhower, 2 February 1953, reprinted in Branyan and Larsen, 
Documentary History, 103-104. 
234 Eisenhower, 216, and Rabb interview, OH- 479, p. 25. 
235 Rabb interview, OH-265, p. 3-4, DDEL. 
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Rabb felt abandoned by his fellow staff members as he began this task.  He later 
suggested that they were all too glad to rid themselves of this because anyone assigned this 
mission was sure to fail.  For example, General Wilton Persons, director of the White House 
legislative group, did not want to begin his career in the White House with a loss in his 
portfolio.236  However, Rabb said that Sherman Adams and the President gave him their full 
support.237  William Ewald, a White House staff member, verified Rabb’s belief that Eisenhower 
fully backed him.  He wrote that Eisenhower:  
listened to Jewish civil rights liberal Max Rabb and backed him to the hilt in the 
summer of 1953 as he walked the corridors of Congress to persuade Eisenhower’s rickety 
one-vote Republican Senate majority to override their own inclinations and the poisonous 
tooth-and-claw enmity of reactionary Democrat Pat McCarran of Nevada, and open the 
flood-gates of the United States to 215,000 European refugees—East German, Dutch, 
Italians, Greeks, and other assorted victims of Europe’s high birth rates, glutted labor 
markets and inpourings (sic) from Iron Curtain satellites.238 
 
As Ewald suggested, President Eisenhower had multiple reasons for supporting new 
legislation in this field.  It was clear to Rabb that Eisenhower believed that the benefits of 
American society should be made available to more people, especially those in dire need.  
However, Eisenhower was also motivated by a desire to check the spread of communism and its 
propaganda.  Rabb’s approach to convincing each Senator to support the President was the same 
approach he took in dealing with Adam Clayton Powell and Secretary Anderson—and equally as 
masterful.  He went and met with each man on an individual basis, just as he gathered delegates 
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into the Eisenhower camp in the 1952 convention, and made personal appeals to them.  He 
started with a visit to Democratic Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, who Rabb knew to be the 
key actor on the committee.  Rabb later recalled what the senator told him in his office, that the 
President “won’t even get it out of the Senate, and what is more, he’s not going to get it out of 
the committee.” Then he literally laughed Rabb out of his office.239 
Rabb then reached out to the Republican members on the committee to garner support 
and generate the required momentum to change the law.  He began with Republican Senator 
Arthur Watkins of Utah, an ally of Senator Joseph McCarthy.  Rabb hid from Watkins the fact 
that Eisenhower considered him impossible, telling him only that Eisenhower was counting on 
him.  Then Rabb, a Jew, knowing Watkins to be a devout Mormon, began discussing faith and 
religion with him.  Rabb guessed that these topics might appeal to him on a deeper level than 
politics.  Rabb impressed Watkins and won his trust, which in turn won Rabb his vote and helped 
turn him to Eisenhower’s point of view.240  Rabb then sought out Senator Everett Dirksen of 
Illinois.  Dirksen was a staunch supporter of Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio to receive the 
Republican nomination for President in 1952 and was, although a Republican, not yet an 
Eisenhower Republican.  Rabb, present at the convention, knew that Dirksen had made public 
derogatory comments about Eisenhower’s campaign and his chances of winning.241  Rabb sensed 
that Dirksen was feeling regretful and seized the moment to offer him a way into Eisenhower’s 
good graces.  Rabb correctly predicted Dirksen’s mood.  Dirksen, hoping to rehabilitate himself, 
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leapt at the opportunity and immediately pledged his vote and support for the issue.242  Rabb’s 
peace offering to Dirksen had legislative implications far beyond the current case Rabb was 
working on.  At a breakfast meeting requested by Dirksen, and arranged by Rabb, Eisenhower 
made peace with Dirksen and offered him a role in his administration.  Eisenhower later wrote 
that he asked Dirksen to be “the verbal leader of the middle-of-the-road philosophy in the 
Senate.”243  From that point on Dirksen remained a close supporter of President Eisenhower’s 
legislative agenda, largely because Rabb saw an opportunity to recruit him into Eisenhower’s 
corner. 
Using this personal approach and making direct appeals to some specific characteristic of 
each man, Rabb converted one senator after another.  The next to be turned in this fashion were 
Senator John Marshall Butler of Maryland and then North Dakota’s William Langer, until finally 
Rabb had enough votes in the Senate.244  Having secured the necessary votes in the Senate, Rabb 
took on the House members and found them much easier to convince than the Senators.  The 
final act, signed into law on August 7, was renamed the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and allowed 
215,000 immigrants, refugees and orphans to enter the United States over three years.245  The 
New York Times “credit[ed] [Rabb] for the extremely difficult job of Congressional persuasion 
needed to get the Refugee Relief Act passed in 1953.”246  Rabb later believed that having this 
law “was an invaluable aid when the Hungarian Revolt broke out because [the U.S.] had some 
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quick way to get people in without having to wait for Congress to act again.”247  On two counts 
this legislative victory helped counter communism.  First, it took some pressure off the shattered 
European nations still trying to rebuild after the war and it offered a haven to those fleeing from 
communist persecution. 
The U.S.S. Midway Pulls into Port  
The early Cold War provided many examples of the growing importance race in the 
international arena.  The case of U.S.S. Midway, an aircraft carrier, making a port call in 
Capetown, South Africa, in mid January, 1955, is another example of the confluence of U.S. race 
relations with foreign policy that had Cold War propaganda implications.  Max Rabb’s role in 
this case was one of trouble-shooting and “fixing.”  His skill in handling the aftermath of the 
Midway visit to South Africa helped the Administration turn the potentially embarrassing 
episode into a victory for the image of American race relations in the eyes of the world.  Perhaps 
what was more important than the work Rabb did to capitalize on the success of the event was 
the influence Rabb had on its most key player, with whom he previously had worked.    
The dilemma was that as the Midway was moored and taking on supplies, the 
disembarking black and white crew members were subject to the segregated practices of South 
Africa.  Many groups expressed their disapproval of the Midway’s port call and wrote the White 
House, State Department and Department of the Navy to protest, including some of the leading 
liberal senators of the day.  Senator Herbert Lehman of New York strongly objected to the 
stopover, calling it “official acquiescence…to the infamous apartheid laws of the Union of South 
Africa.”  Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey demanded either equal treatment of all American 
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sailors or a termination of the port call.248  In a reply to Senator Humphrey, a State Department 
official said that the port call was for routine purposes.  The official explained that the Midway 
left the East Coast on its way to the Far East and would go by way of Capetown, Colombo, and 
Singapore to its final destination.  The official also reminded the senator that it was customary 
that visiting foreign military personnel observe and respect the local laws and customs but that 
doing so did not constitute endorsement or approval of those laws.249  One could imagine Rabb 
having mixed feelings about this.  One the one hand, the U.S. Navy that Rabb had so recently 
helped to integrate provided a shining example of social justice to the South Africans and the 
world.  However, it must have weighed on him that, after winning hard fought freedoms at home, 
blacks would have to endure segregation abroad as they still did in many places at home. 
His feelings did not prevent him from seizing the occasion and turning it into a 
“propaganda boomerang,” as one newspaper described Rabb’s handling of the matter.  He was 
able to do so largely because the port call was free of incident.  Even Rabb expressed his surprise 
at that when he responded to a letter from Senator John Adams of the Nebraska State 
Legislature.  He wrote that the whole event “turned out much more favorably than was 
anticipated.”  He also stressed that South African visitors to the Midway witnessed a first-hand 
demonstration of an integrated military.250   
Fittingly, Rabb was not alone among those whose work in desegregating the Navy came 
full circle in this case.  The Captain of the Midway was none other than R.D. “Tobie” Hogle.  
Hogle was Secretary Anderson’s aide in the summer of 1953 when Rabb first approached the 
Navy about integration.  No one could have understood the importance of this trip more than 
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Hogle, who dealt directly with Rabb in 1953 to integrate the Navy.  Columnist Drew Pearson 
wrote that it was Hogle who ordered his sailors not to provoke any situations by their mere 
presence in any establishment while on shore leave.251  The Consul General reported to the State 
Department that the trip was a tremendous success and that the Minister of Justice had ordered 
all Capetown recreational facilities and social establishments to suspend their laws and serve the 
non-white members of the Midway—which they did.  This was because Hogle had negotiated 
some terms with South African authorities in order to avoid incident.  Meanwhile, the Midway 
received more than 20,000 visitors of all races and treated them in an integrated manner while 
touring the ship.  Finally, the Consul wrote that Captain Hogle had acted in the “highest 
American tradition [and] handled [the] situation impartially and extremely well.”252   
In order to capitalize on the uneventful port call, managed by his former contact Hogle, 
Rabb immediately met with two leading black journalists, Alice Dunigan of the Associated 
Negro Press and Ethel Payne of the Chicago Defender.  Max Rabb told them that the visit served 
as a “demonstration to the South Africans of how non-segregated democracy works.”  Rabb 
advised the Navy to explain the port call the same way.253  Rabb reported to James H. Smith, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, that he had met with the Negro Newspaper Publisher’s 
Association and they were “unanimous in agreeing” with him that the visit was necessary and 
beneficial.  Furthermore, the publishers agreed to counter any adverse publicity of the event.  
                                                 
251 The Washington Post and Times Herald, 2 February 1955, Column entitled the “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” 
by Drew Pearson.   
252 Telegram, Consul General Stone to State Department, 18 January 1955, USS Midway, South Africa Visit (2), 
Box 58, Rabb Papers, DDEL.  The Consul also pointed out that the Ambassador noted South African contributions 
to the recently ended Korean War.  The Consul wrote, “South Africans also died [in] Korea in defense [of the] free 
world with [the] Second Air Squadron being [the] only foreign Air Force serving without interruption under 
American command.  
253 The Washington Post and Times Herald, 2 February 1955, Column entitled the “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” 
by Drew Pearson.   
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Smith thanked Rabb for his involvement and advised him that the Navy was handling it the same 
way Rabb was, by declaring it a successful trip and a “net gain” for integration.254 
Whatever gains might be made in showing off an integrated Navy—argued Adam 
Clayton Powell—were not worth the sacrifices blacks would have to endure at home.  In a 
private telegram to the White House—remaining true to his word and not openly criticizing the 
President—he demanded the name of the individual who scheduled the port call and further 
demanded that the Midway leave immediately.  He effectively argued that, by the Navy’s 
accepting local customs abroad, segregationists at home could argue that the Navy must accept 
local customs in the American South.255  Rabb may or may not have agreed with Powell’s logic, 
but he did not respond to it directly.  While it was still too early to declare it a victory—as he 
later would—he was cautiously optimistic in his response to Powell.  He wrote “that [the] 
incident may have rebounded to our credit and may actually have done much to advance the 
cause of justice and equality far beyond our own borders.”  He wrote to Powell, that over 23,000 
had visited the Midway and were treated equally and that an integrated American team had 
played an exhibition game of baseball against an all-white South African team.  In conclusion he 
wrote that the “Navy policies made a tremendous impact on the people of the Capetown 
community.”   
Rabb did not exaggerate those claims.  They were also reported by independent news 
sources.  The long-term importance of the visit may have been exaggerated but there is no doubt 
that the immediate results were positive.  Rabb was able to capitalize on that good fortune and 
disseminate the story of naval integration, which he had had a hand in completing.  There is no 
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evidence of communication between Hogle and Rabb during this time.  Despite that, it is safe to 
assume that Hogle understood how damaging a disastrous port call would have been to U.S. 
prestige abroad and how it might have negatively affected its ability to influence foreign nations.  
Indeed, Hogle had already been treated to a front-row seat in the summer of 1953 as he watched 
Rabb quietly guide the Navy towards integration.  He had in fact been more than a spectator; he 
had facilitated the communication between the White House and Navy.  Yes—Hogle knew the 
importance of this port call.   
The New York Times reported that the event had a “wholesome aftermath” and that the 
South Africans substantially lowered their racial barriers to accommodate the American sailors.  
The Times also credited Captain Hogle and Consul John P. Stone for negotiating with the South 
African authorities to ensure that the visit was smooth and without blemish.  The report 
concluded that the visit “ended with thorough satisfaction and expressions of goodwill on both 
sides” and that “Capetown would not mind if the Midway paid another visit.”256   
Max Rabb, Jewish, American, and Republican 
Max Rabb—as a Jew—was aware of his own minority status in the United States and that 
of his people in the world.  He was always mindful that there might come a time when he might 
have to choose between being a Jew, an American Jew, and an American Jewish Republican.  As 
Max’s concentric rings of identity became more layered and complex over time, so also arose the 
greater possibility of a conflict among them.  In addition to his unofficial role as the “minority 
rights advisor,” Rabb was also the “unofficial official” point man to the Jewish-American 
                                                 
256 The New York Times, 23 January 1955, article entitled, “Capetown Eased Law for Midway.” 
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community.257  It is very clear that even if Max Rabb had never touched civil rights or race-
related issues in the White House, he would certainly have had this assignment.  Rabb was so 
well known in Jewish circles that he drew the attention of American Jews by default.  Potential 
conflicts did arise when Rabb was required to defend the Eisenhower administration when it 
made policy decisions either unfavorable to Israel or unpopular with American Jews—or both. 
Rabb admitted that he vociferously defended Israel but that “there were times when [he] 
knew that a Jewish demand was absolutely wrong.”258  He later said he very carefully “tried not 
to be a Jewish representative.”259  In all likelihood that is because he agreed with Eisenhower 
that no group should have a designated special representative in the White House and because 
such labels might constrict his ability to get things done.  Rabb was at once a devout Jew and 
Eisenhower Republican. But at times these loyalties competed against each other.  As in civil 
rights, the Eisenhower Administration wished to keep its support of Israel less than well known, 
and very often did not publish its pro-Israeli actions.  Rabb wished to publicize these pro-Israeli 
actions but the State Department refused to allow it.  It is unclear why, but evidence suggests that 
what Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, wanted were equal relations with 
the Arab and Jewish worlds.260  Open support of Israel jeopardized the United States’ chances of 
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Press Secretary, 9 November 1955, Israel-Jewish Matter (1), Box 59, Rabb Papers, DDEL. 
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having a balanced relationship with each competing bloc.  What was especially alarming to 
Eisenhower and Dulles was that portions of the Arab bloc had made friendly overtures toward 
communist nations, which threatened to alter the delicate balance of power in the early Cold 
War.261           
By the fall of 1956 the State Department had aroused the ire of Jewish Americans in two 
ways.  First, the State Department prohibited Jewish Americans from serving in Arab nations—
either as service members or as State Department employees.  And Jewish Americans 
increasingly began to feel that the United States was promoting Arab issues at the expense of 
Israel.  The State Department, using the same logic to defend the Midway port call, argued that it 
was bound to obey the laws of foreign nations even if it meant discrimination against Americans.  
John Foster Dulles expressed his regrets about that sad truth in a response to a letter from Helen 
Rogers Reid, former President and Chair of the Board of Directors for the New York Herald 
Tribune.  He wrote that his efforts were “circumscribed by the fundamental principle that 
sovereign states have the right to control their internal affairs in such manner as they deem to be 
in their own best interest.”  He added that forcing our view on Arab nations would only cause 
resentment and that he believed “an equitable and just peace settlement” of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute would ease those restrictions upon Jews.  Although addressed to Reid, Dulles provided a 
copy of the response to Rabb and Adams.262              
Rabb also pleaded Reid’s case to Adams.  He told Adams that if Dulles only publicized 
his own achievements on behalf of American Jews then there would be less negative publicity on 
                                                 
261 Egypt made an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, conferred with the Soviets in order to build a dam on the Nile and 
withdrew recognition of Chang Kai-shek and Free China in order to recognize Communist China, Walter LeFeber, 
America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006 10th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 188-189.    
262 Letter, John Foster Dulles to Mrs. Ogden M. Reid (Helen Rogers Reid), 17 September 1956, Israel-Jewish 
Matters (3), Box 59, Rabb Papers, DDEL; Memorandum, John Hanes, State Department, to Adams, 18 September 
1956, Israel-Jewish Matters (2), Box 59, Rabb Papers, DDEL 
 107
the topic and anger from the Jewish community.  He said Dulles’ “fine efforts…to prevent 
discrimination among American citizens on the basis of religion should be revealed to the 
public.”  He further advised Adams that a future meeting he was going to discuss Dulles’ “very 
fine record” and mention how he negotiated with “France and Canada to provide Israel with jet 
planes.”  To Rabb, the sum of Dulles’ actions amounted to a fine record of achievement.  The 
military aid, Dulles’ protests against discrimination and a recently negotiated export-import loan 
were, to Rabb, great examples of that record.  He was confident that were it only more widely 
known, it would secure more “votes and friends in large numbers.”  He, therefore, wished to 
“exploit [this record] in [his] speeches around the country,” because for reasons unknown—or 
unspoken—the State Department “keeps it quiet.”263  
Rabb expressed the same sentiments to the State Department the very next day.  Rabb 
named four states he had spoken in and another six he was going to speak in.  Rabb’s speeches 
focused on the Eisenhower Administration’s general accomplishments, but “at least 50% and at 
least two (speeches) in every state are directed at the handling of the Israel question.”  Then 
Rabb could contain himself no more and said that while he hinted at Dulles’ fine record he felt 
“like a criminal every time [he spoke] on this subject because [he did] not feel at liberty to speak 
freely about his accomplishments.”  Then Rabb openly asked for permission to speak on the 
favorable marks of Dulles’ record on Israel.  Rabb specifically wanted to openly tout the 
negotiation of jets for Israel from France and Canada and the previously mentioned import and 
export loan arrangement.  He also wanted to mention the fact that Dulles had protested Arab 
restrictions on American Jews in their lands.264  Despite not being able to go public with such 
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praise, Rabb did share these accomplishments with at least one concerned Congressman.  Rabb 
told him that Israel was stronger because of American support, to include the sharing of 
knowledge in the area of atomic energy.265  Despite his desire to strengthen the Republican 
image among Jewish Americans, even Rabb had his limits and he was no match for Dulles.  It 
appeared that he quietly withdrew his attempts to trade the silence of the State Department for 
the ringing praise he felt they deserved.  
Max Rabb and the Virgin Islands 
In early May 1954 Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, sent Nebraska 
Senator Hugh Butler of the Insular Affairs Committee a telegram.  He, on behalf of NAACP, 
strongly opposed and urged Butler not to support Senate Bill S3378, which sought to amend the 
Virgin Islands’ governing document—the Organic Act of 1936.  White argued that the bill 
“reduce[ed] [the] partial autonomy granted [the] islanders in…1936” because it transferred 
power from the elected legislature to the appointed governor and Secretary of the Interior.  
Furthermore, White argued that the islanders—overwhelmingly black—had “master[ed] the 
democratic process” and this indicated they were ready to elect their own governor and resident 
commissioner.  Then White tried to leverage Butler into not rescinding those privileges by 
appealing to the world situation.  He said he was convinced that, given the “world wide rebellion 
against colonialism” in Asia, South America, and Africa, this was a backward step.  White 
believed it would “do irreparable harm to America’s reputation and prestige.”266 
Butler was “surprised and puzzled” at White’s claim.  Butler believed the revised act 
empowered the islanders because it provided measures to make them less dependent on 
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government appropriations to make up for their yearly deficits.  Butler conceded that the only 
power taken from the Legislature and given to a Governor—in the revised act—was the authority 
to “fill non-policy posts in the local government.”  Then Butler cited convincing data that 
suggested the islanders were either against the election of their own Governor or indifferent to 
it.267  Kirk Coulter, the clerk to Butler’s committee, sent Rabb White’s telegram and Butler’s 
response and asked him if he advised publishing both to a greater audience.  Rabb in turn asked 
E. Frederic Morrow his opinion on the whole matter and gave his own.  He believed that Butler’s 
legislation was a vast improvement but acknowledged that the bill did take away some powers 
from the islanders.  Rabb further hinted that the Organic Act of 1936 might have sentimental 
value to blacks—especially the NAACP.  It was “a result of [Judge William] Hastie’s efforts”—
who had been the first African American Governor of the Virgin Islands.268  Therefore, the 
Organic Act of 1936 might be imbued with symbolic value because it had been crafted by a 
black man for black people and, despite its deficiencies, was a source of pride for many in the 
black community.  Morrow later confirmed the accuracy of this sentiment.                  
Morrow was very disturbed by Butler’s desire to publish the response and urged Rabb to 
advise the committee not to release it to a greater audience.269  Morrow acknowledged that 
Hastie’s connection precipitated the situation and added an emotional element to the situation, 
but firmly believed that there was genuine merit to White’s final claim.  Morrow said that the 
Administration could not just “slough off or argue down…the whole matter of the enlightened 
islander’s desire for autonomy and self-government.”  He predicted that the NAACP would put 
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up a spirited fight and perhaps try to embarrass the administration because the bill repudiated the 
“Republican philosophy of more, instead of less, democracy for all the people around the world.”  
Morrow believed that the “salient peg” of White’s argument—linking the matter to the world 
situation—was brilliant and unassailable.  Despite this, Morrow did not condemn the bill.  He 
merely pointed out that it would be unpopular among the black elite.  Finally, Morrow worried 
that the timing of this affair might have repercussions in view of upcoming state visits by two 
prominent black leaders, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President William Tubman of 
Liberia.270  Clearly, Morrow believed that even the perception of denying Virgin Islanders 
democratic freedoms might damage relations between the United States and potential or current 
African allies.       
 Rabb had quickly become a lightning-rod for this issue with different groups 
focusing their attention on him.  Evidently, Rabb’s reputation was known as far as the Virgin 
Islands and interestingly he was courted by both sides in the fight. Rabb was clearly considered 
as a powerful potential ally in this fight and every group wanted him as an advocate.  Rabb 
received a plea from the Virgin Islands asking him not to support the bill because it stifled the 
aspirations of the people for self-government.271  Then he received a friendly but urgent plea 
from the Government Secretary of the Virgin Islands asking him “to make every effort” to bring 
the act to the Floor of the House of Representatives.272  Rabb was not as concerned as Morrow 
was with perceptions.  He believed it would deliver the efficiencies it promised even though it 
would deny the islanders the right to elect their Governor.  Despite the improvements the new 
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bill would afford, Rabb appreciated and could not easily dismiss the element of race in what 
might otherwise be a beneficial piece of legislation.   
The revised act, according to Senator Butler, equalized the standing of the Virgin Islands 
with that of the United States’ other territories—Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska.  With the exception 
of Puerto Rico, which did elect its own Governor, the revised act afforded the Virgin Islands the 
same treatment as those other lands.  The consistency in American policy towards its territories 
was itself a form of equality.  This greater purpose may have prevailed in Rabb’s mind to offset 
the loss of those privileges which, it appeared, only a few islanders might miss.273    
   The revised act took most of the month of June to get through both houses.  Amazingly, 
French Stewart, Counsel to the Insular Affairs Committee, told Rabb that he would carefully 
consider “any suggestion [he rendered about] which version the Conference should adopt.”274  It 
seems clear that Rabb’s opinion and position in the White House were highly valued.  Once 
Rabb knew the act was going to pass he focused his attention on scheduling a public ceremony 
for the signing of the act.  Its champion, Senator Butler, had died in early July 1954, but Rabb 
believed a public signing would boost the morale of the Governor and all the islanders.275  
Rabb—ever considerate of others—believed it might be an outward sign that the President 
thought it was important. 
Conclusion 
 Race had become an undeniable consideration in diplomatic affairs by the mid-
nineteen fifties.  Its effects were so powerful that even the internal racial policies of nations 
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became subject to international scrutiny.  These internal policies were also potential yardsticks to 
measure the intentions and sincerity of the United States when it dealt with nations of differing 
races.  Racial sentiment could no longer be dismissed when making foreign policy decisions.  
These four cases show the interwoven nature of domestic and foreign policy decisions and the 
added complexity of race as an element in both.  The convergence of these factors in the early 
Cold War heightened the significance of Max Rabb’s work in the Eisenhower Administration 
and simultaneously increased his personal prestige as he guarded the national prestige of the 
United States.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 Maxwell Milton Rabb tendered his resignation in April 1958 and in May 
officially from the Eisenhower Administration.  Fred Morrow recalled that many of Rabb’s 
friends held a farewell luncheon for him and that it was well attended by several senators, 
Sherman Adams and Vice-President Richard Nixon.276  After more than five years of exhausting 
work and simultaneously raising four children on the salary of a White House staff member, Max 
and Ruth Rabb decided that he needed to provide more income for them.  He went back into 
private practice as an attorney in New York City.277  Rabb remained involved with many 
government projects and served in some official capacity in the administrations of Presidents 
Johnson, Nixon, and Ford.  His government service culminated as the United States Ambassador 
to Italy from 1981 through 1988 under President Ronald Reagan.278  He died in New York City 
on June 9, 2002 at the age of 91.279  Congressman Charles Rangel of New York City delivered 
one of the eulogies at the funeral.  He praised Rabb for his early efforts in advancing civil rights 
and desegregating the federal establishment.280       
 The full effect of Rabb’s life is beyond the scope of this study.  Rabb did many 
more things for the Eisenhower Administration than were mentioned in this work.  None of the 
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work he later did for future Presidents involved civil rights.  This suggests that he was as broadly 
regarded for his ability to solve the more general problems of government as he was for 
advancing civil rights. 
 Nonetheless, it is in the field of civil rights that Rabb’s work had the widest 
influence.  Popular awareness of civil rights and race relations as moral problems was much 
greater in the election of 1960 than they were in 1952.281  Rabb undeniably helped to raise the 
political awareness of that fact.  Rabb like President Truman—and perhaps more so—believed in 
racial liberalism.  Rabb believed in harnessing the authority and resources of the government to 
advance any causes that benefited racial and religious minorities.  Max Rabb’s work continued 
the liberal traditions of the New Deal.  Despite being a Republican he provided the White House 
with liberal continuity stretching back to Franklin Roosevelt.  In this sense Max Rabb was part of 
a greater movement.  Rabb was a liberal Republican in an era when conservative elements of the 
party were on the rise.  Liberal Republicans sought to broaden the party’s electoral base by 
making some accommodation with the public philosophy of the New Deal.282  Racial liberalism 
was the natural consequence of the faith that many of the American people had in their 
government’s ability to solve social problems through government action, legislation and 
regulation.  Rabb, in a real way, could link his advocacy and activism to the New Deal.  This was 
a very important link with potentially enormous electoral consequences as many Americans 
dearly remembered Roosevelt and his programs, especially black Americans.  Although the 
conservative elements of the party succeeded in eliminating the liberal wing of the party at the 
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presidential level after 1960, Rabb and those like him represented an important historical tether 
to the New Deal and its liberal traditions. 
 As impressive as Max Rabb’s efforts were, they do not change the historical 
outcomes we have come to know.  Max Rabb’s work to improve civil rights was a staggering 
achievement.  Some have suggested that he was on a parallel course with Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell.  Both wanted Eisenhower to play a bigger and direct role in supporting civil 
rights.  While Brownell was taking legal actions on behalf of Eisenhower, such as filing an 
amicus brief prior to the Brown decision and drafting the Civil Rights Bill of 1957, Rabb was on 
a political track.  Both men were nudging Eisenhower forward.  Rabb did this by recruiting 
Powell, desegregating the military establishment, creating the Fair Employment Committee, and 
otherwise interceding when and where he could on behalf of minorities.  Despite Rabb and 
Brownell’s best efforts and their singular records, neither could spur Eisenhower into taking a 
more personally active and visible role in civil rights.283   
By May 1958, both men had resigned from the Eisenhower Administration but even their 
impressive records of achievement on behalf of Eisenhower could not stave off black activism or 
save Richard Nixon in the election of 1960.  By this time Morrow—who assumed many of 
Rabb’s race-related duties—warned Eisenhower of a “new trend” in the South—a student protest 
movement.  He was uncertain if the rise of black civil disobedience and direct action was a 
positive development or not.  Student protests and non-violent confrontations did not rely on 
federal authority to force negotiations with segregationists.  However, this strategy threatened to 
involve the federal government as protesters became increasingly susceptible to police brutality 
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and civil rights violations.284  Had Eisenhower taken a more personal role in civil rights, he 
might have averted or delayed this protest movement which over the course of the 1960s played 
itself out very dramatically on television for the world to watch.   
Full citizenship and equal access to all the social, political and economic benefits of a 
free society were the goals of the civil rights movement.  Eisenhower, contrary to those who say 
otherwise, made real progress in the area of civil rights and race relations but was a victim of his 
own success.  In essence the problem of civil rights is one of scale—some is never enough.   
What Rabb and others did on Eisenhower’s behalf amounted to great and necessary steps but 
they were all far short of the ultimate goal of full citizenship.  Measured against that standard 
anything less was failure.  This explains the most common interpretation of Eisenhower’s civil 
rights legacy—that it was a barren period between two Presidents who were more sympathetic 
and ended up with better records.  However, Max Rabb and his work undermine any claim that 
Eisenhower had a weak civil rights record.  All together, Rabb’s work along with that of others 
was tremendously important.  But it is widely considered a failure because most black 
Americans remember only what it failed to do—provide full citizenship.  
Ultimately President Eisenhower is responsible for the failures—perceived or real—of 
his policies.  However, Eisenhower should be given credit for the successful efforts of his 
subordinates, like Rabb, who could only do as much as Eisenhower’s limits would permit them.  
Rabb, as an advisor, could only recommend action and, though he had great liberty, Rabb never 
went outside of Eisenhower’s boundaries.  By staying within them he had a better chance of 
widening Eisenhower’s narrow straits.  Had Rabb begun any project with a premise that was 
outside of Eisenhower’s limits he would have lost credibility and his ability to influence the 
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President.   We cannot know what Eisenhower’s record on civil rights would have been without 
Max Rabb in the White House.  Given what Fred Morrow said about Rabb, one can safely 
conclude that Eisenhower’s record would have been worse without him.  That Rabb 
accomplished as much as he did was a victory for civil rights in and of itself.  Morrow wrote in 
his memoirs upon Rabb’s resignation from the White House staff: 
Thus comes to a close the official career of a colorful individual.  He will be missed in 
the White House.  Although I did not always agree with his actions in handling minority group 
affairs, he was pioneering in a difficult and complex field.  Max Rabb has a high code of ethics, 
and is certainly an honest man of great integrity.  There were many times, however, when his 
soul was sorely tried within and without.  I must honestly confess that he was perhaps the only 
one on the White House staff who showed deep personal concern about the plight of the Negro 
and other minorities in the country.285   
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